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ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BOARD-




Timothy L. Baker 
 
 Utilizing available information about ERM practices within organizations 
disclosed by boards of directors in annual proxy statements filed with the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), this study expands the understanding of the value of 
disclosure of board-level ERM oversight information in proxy statements. The study first 
creates a board-level ERM engagement index (BODERMX) to identify aspects of board 
engagement in the ERM efforts disclosed by companies.  Development of this index will 
present opportunities to future researchers to conduct empirical ERM-related research as 
information about firms’ ERM is costly to obtain.  The study next examines associations 
between the extent of board engagement in ERM as measured by the index and (i) 
volatility of earnings, (ii) firm valuation, and (iii) the pricing of audit services by external 
auditors measured as outcomes.   
 After coding ERM disclosures of companies in the S&P 500 for 2010 to 2014, the 
final sample consists of 2,264 company-year observations used to create the BODERMX.  
The results of the volatility of earnings regressed on BODERMX are significant and 
negative, suggesting that more robust board-level ERM practices are associated with less 




with less volatility in earnings, the study finds that investors appear to not value the 
benefits of more robust board-level risk oversight since the association between 
BODERMX and firm valuation (Tobin’s Q) is significant and negative. The evidence 
suggests investors might be perceiving additional board-level ERM implies greater risks 
facing the firm and/or investors may prefer to manage investment risk at the portfolio 
level. Additional analysis of the relationship between Tobin’s Q (TQ) and the individual 
practices that comprise BODERMX suggests that investors value strategic use of ERM, 
consistent with resource dependence theory, but do not value additional ERM 
governance, consistent with the cost/benefit rationale of agency theory.  Finally, the study 
finds that the association of BODERMX and current year audit fees is not significant., 
suggesting that the extent of engagement by the board of directors in risk oversight does 
not affect the pricing of audit services  Additional analyses indicate that investors and 
auditors, in particular, value specific aspects of the firm’s ERM processes differently, 
depending on whether the focus of ERM is on strategy execution (consistent with 
resource dependence theory) versus risk governance (consistent with agency theory).  
These findings taken together indicate that various stakeholders utilize ERM information 
in different manners. 
 
Keywords: Enterprise Risk Management, ERM, Board Risk Oversight, Strategic 
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It is always wise to look ahead, but difficult to look further than you can see. 
Winston Churchill 
Over the past several years a number of governance failures have led to growing 
expectations for more effective enterprise-wide risk oversight.  These events include 
market channel shifts at organizations that failed to recognize the patterns leading to their 
demise such as Blockbuster, Circuit City, and Kodak, among others.  Conversely, large 
banking organizations that were mandated to practice risk management by regulators 
failed to foresee the inevitable “lending bubble” and crash that would follow.  While 
many firms adopted ERM prior to the 2008-2009 recession, the severe economic 
consequences recognized during and following the recession underscored the need for 
enhanced risk oversight.  Due to these occurrences, many have called for greater 
oversight and transparency of ERM efforts, including the SEC (2009). 
Boards of directors have responded to a number of these calls for more enhanced 
board-level risk oversight.  While the SEC implemented new proxy disclosure rules for 
public companies starting in 2010 that require the board to disclose its role in risk 





as part of its enterprise-wide risk oversight.  As a result, the nature of the board’s risk 
oversight is uncertain, given we don’t know the extent of what they are doing and how 
they are enhancing their oversight of management’s risk-taking on the part of 
shareholders. And, we don’t know whether certain board risk oversight activities are 
value-adding or not. 
The first primary purpose of this study is to create a board-level ERM 
engagement index (BODERMX) that can be used to measure the ERM oversight efforts 
disclosed by boards of directors in their annual proxy statements.  The second overall 
purpose is to examine how ERM practices captured by this index are related to measures 
that reflect the impact of those ERM activities on certain firm-level outcomes that include 
(i) volatility of earnings, (ii) firm valuation, and (iii) the pricing of audit services by 
external auditors as outcomes.  The first two measures have been widely employed in 
studies examining ERM efforts, but they have not been examined in the context of board 
disclosures of risk oversight, and the third has not been the subject of research despite the 
fact that auditors routinely evaluate clients’ risk management processes as a part of their 
audit planning responsibilities.  In sensitivity testing, I employ additional measures. 
ERM is argued as a useful governance paradigm that helps companies understand 
that risks within and external to the entity are interrelated and viewed as a holistic risk 
portfolio.  To help management and boards of directors understand the fundamental 
principles of an effective ERM process to manage risk, The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO) created its Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework 
in 2004 (COSO, 2004).1  The COSO ERM Framework encompasses the 1992 Internal 
                                                          
1 On June 15, 2016, COSO released an exposure draft of an update to their 2004 ERM framework titled, 





Control – Integrated Framework (COSO, 1992) and extends the field of risk 
management across the entity. This extension allows entities to proactively manage risks 
and opportunities, rather than only utilizing reactive controls to counter risks.   
COSO and most ERM information users look to the full board of directors as 
being responsible for the oversight of ERM (COSO, 2009).  However, changes in the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) governance rules effective in 2004 assign primary 
risk oversight at the board level to the audit committee (NYSE, 2004).  The NYSE 
regulation states audit committees must “discuss policies with respect to risk assessment 
and risk oversight” (NYSE, 2004, 303a.07).  To keep investors and other stakeholders 
abreast of corporate risk management practices, the SEC introduced regulation requiring 
annual proxy disclosure of a board’s effort in risk management oversight (SEC, 2009).  
However, the SEC does not specify the elements of ERM disclosure; it gives the board 
discretion to disclose its ERM oversight responsibilities and practices. Since there is no 
boilerplate disclosure requirement, corporate risk management or ERM disclosure 
practices are likely to vary. 
 The limited prior academic research on ERM has evolved over the last decade 
while providing mixed evidence concerning its effectiveness.  Initial research focused on 
the determinants of ERM, with several studies utilizing the announcement of a chief risk 
officer (CRO) as an indicator of ERM effort (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; Pagach & Warr, 
2010; Pagach & Warr, 2011; Beasley, Pagach, & Warr, 2008).  Some of these studies 
utilized the CRO indicator in an attempt to measure the value of ERM, producing 






 As new sources of information became available concerning ERM efforts, 
researchers began to utilize these sources to explore ERM further.  The level of ERM 
implementation maturity was measured through surveys (Beasley, Branson, & Hancock, 
2009; Beasley, Branson, & Hancock, 2015; Beasley, Branson, and Pagach, 2015) and 
information from external ratings agencies such as Standard & Poors (S&P) (Baxter, 
Bedard, Hoitash, and Yezegel, 2013; McShane, Nair, & Rustambekov, 2011).  Despite 
these sources of ERM maturity, researchers are still in need for more robust information 
about detailed ERM processes ongoing within an organization. This study contributes to 
this literature by using board-level disclosures of ERM-related activities to construct a 
board risk oversight index that helps capture varying levels of ERM maturity across 
organizations. 
 As further information became available about the ongoing maturity of 
organizations’ ERM implementations, the objective of the integration of strategic 
management and ERM was investigated (Beasley et al., 2015; Viscelli, Beasley, & 
Hermanson, 2015a).  These two studies found that some organizations are reporting that 
their maturing processes are leading to the attainment of the strategic integration of ERM, 
but not all entities are realizing strategic value from their risk oversight efforts.  To date, 
there has been limited study concerning the use of board-level ERM information 
disclosures to understand their contribution to an organization’s strategic success.  
Accordingly, several research objectives are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 The rationale for the first primary purpose of this study is to understand the nature 
and extent of risk oversight activities in which boards of directors engage.  The SEC 





practices in annual proxy statements starting in 2010, but gave no specific guidance as to 
the structure of board risk oversight that should be utilized (SEC, 2009).  This study 
examines these disclosures and creates a board-level engagement index for ERM.  The 
board-level ERM engagement index aims to provide a comprehensive measure to capture 
the board-level risk oversight activities disclosed by a company. The creation of this 
board-level ERM index may be useful to future researchers by providing a more 
comprehensive measure of ERM maturity than what is examined in prior research. 
 The second primary purpose of this study is to examine how ERM practices 
captured by this index are related to three firm-level risk related outcomes that include 
the volatility of earnings, firm valuation, and audit client risk assessments as proxied by 
the magnitude of the audit fee. The volatility of earnings has been previously used as a 
measure to indicate an organization’s ability to minimize significant surprises in its 
operations (Beasley et al., 2008; Pagach & Warr, 2010; McShane et al., 2011, Edmonds, 
Edmonds, Leece & Vermeer, 2015).  Utilizing earnings volatility in this study helps 
determine if companies with higher board-level ERM index scores are associated with 
less risk-related operational variance captured by the volatility of earnings.   
Firm valuation has been utilized in previous research to understand the 
association between firm value and various ERM measures (Beasley, Pagach & Warr, 
2008; Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; McShane, Nair & Rustambekov, 2011; Baxter, Bedard, 
Hoitash & Yezegel, 2013).  In relation to firm valuation, I examine whether companies 
with higher board-level ERM index scores are valued more by investors than companies 





whether investors place additional value on the firm due to more robust oversight by the 
board of directors of management’s risk-taking actions on behalf of shareholders.   
Finally, the third firm level outcome measure examined relates to the value 
auditors place on board-level ERM oversight practices when assessing the risk of 
material misstatements as a part of their audit pricing decisions.  I am particularly 
interested in whether there is any association between the extent of board risk oversight 
disclosures and audit fees that might suggest auditors may be using ERM information 
disclosed by boards of directors in their overall engagement risk assessment process 
conducted as part of their engagement acceptance and pricing. This information could 
offer the auditor insight into how the entity is handling risks beyond the scope of a 
normal internal control lens and that insight might inform them in the audit pricing 
process.  Results from this examination will allow auditors, boards of directors, 
management, and regulators to better understand the value of ERM information to 
auditors. 
 I extracted the board risk oversight disclosures of companies listed on the S&P 
500 index for the years 2010-2014 to gather 2,264 observations.  The S&P 500 index was 
chosen due to the ability of those organizations to enact comprehensive programs early 
given their access to resources that might help them improve their risk oversight.  The 
observations are used to create the BODERMX, which consists of eight individual 
practices disclosed by the board of directors in their proxies during that period.  The 
BODERMX index is then utilized to understand its relationship with variance of earnings 






 My findings make several contributions to the literature surrounding ERM.  First, 
the study is unique in using an index of ERM oversight practices disclosed by boards of 
directors to measure boards’ engagement in ERM.  Prior studies have largely focused on 
a single item disclosed by the entity, such as the announcement of a Chief Risk Officer, 
presence of a risk committee, or items outside of disclosure such as credit ratings 
assessments in the creation of an ERM index (Pagach & Warr, 2011; Hines, Masli, 
Mauldin, & Peters, 2015; Gordon, Loeb, & Tseng, 2009).  A single item measure may 
not capture the various facets of board-related ERM activities, and the use of non-board 
ERM disclosures may not reflect what boards report they do in relation to ERM.  The 
creation of the BODERMX index will provide future researchers a more comprehensive 
ERM maturity variable that represents the composite board-level ERM engagement effort 
in their studies.  Regulators and stakeholders may also want to consider utilizing this 
index and/or developing their own index to capture composite efforts of the board in 
ERM oversight. 
 Second, the study uses this newly created index to examine how the level of 
board-related ERM oversight is associated with three different firm-level outcomes.  The 
first outcome relates to the association of board-level ERM oversight and volatility of 
earnings.  I find that firms with higher board-level ERM oversight disclosure have a 
lower variance of earnings, suggesting that more engagement of the board in risk 
oversight leads to fewer surprises that impact earnings.  This relationship informs boards, 
management, regulators, auditors, and researchers concerning the effectiveness of board-





engagement in ERM provide risk oversight and related information to management that 
manifests in less volatile earnings. 
 Third, the association between Tobin’s Q and board-level oversight engagement 
is negatively significant for the entire sample.  Additional analysis utilizing a sub-sample 
comprised of companies in the S&P 500 index for all five years reveals a significant 
negative relationship between these two variables.  This direction is opposite that found 
in other ERM studies utilizing Tobin’s Q as a measure.  The direction of the relationship 
indicates that companies with more board-level ERM oversight may be valued less by 
investors, suggesting that investors may not value individual entity efforts to manage 
risks given they prefer investment diversification techniques for their risk management 
strategy.  Alternate analysis comparing the individual ERM practices that comprise 
BODERMX suggests investors using a resource dependence view in support of the 
integration between strategy and ERM, but also utilizing a cost/benefit rationale of 
agency theory as indicated by their dislike of additional ERM governance. 
Fourth, the association between audit fees and board-level ERM engagement is 
not significant.  The lack of significance may indicate that auditors do not find value in 
ERM taken as a whole, requiring further investigation into which practices they do value. 
Fifth, the results of this study are important to regulators trying to understand 
whether and how ERM information disclosure is utilized by various stakeholders. The 
results of this study suggest that the information may be used differently by stakeholders, 
consistent with the intent of the SEC’s initiative to require firms disclose ERM oversight 





 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the prior 
literature and discusses hypotheses proposed relative to these research questions. Section 
III discusses the research method that was utilized to test the hypotheses, as well as data 
collection procedures.  Sections IV and V discuss the results of the study and additional 
analysis.  The paper concludes in Section VI, to include possible directions for future 




II. BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESES 
Background 
 The increasingly complex operating environments encountered by organizations 
and the uncertainties introduced by a host of other factors such as the progression of 
information technology, the continual threat of cyber risks, continued growth in the 
globalization of business, geo-political uncertainty, reputational risk and unstable global 
economies are affecting the risk environment for all types of organizations. To better 
manage these uncertainties, a number of entities are embracing enterprise risk 
management (ERM) to enhance their risk oversight.  ERM is a business paradigm that 
adopts an enterprise-wide approach to risk oversight by encouraging the use of a holistic 
risk management approach, capitalizing on the traditional risk management model 
utilized by the finance industry (McShane, Nair, & Rustambekov, 2011).  
 COSO established its Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework (the 
ERM Framework) in 2004 to provide a principles-based framework to address 
organizations’ need to manage risk from multiple areas simultaneously, rather than 
addressing risk as isolated instances within departments and divisions, and to emphasize 
the importance of understanding that multiple risks could be interrelated.  COSO (2004, 
p. 1) defined ERM as follows: 
Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management, and other personnel, applied in a strategy setting 





affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives.  The 
concept of risk management originated from the fields of corporate 
finance, insurance, and utilities where risk is incorporated into various 
hedging strategies to reduce the total investment risk for the firm 
(McShane et al., 2011).  The risk management profession tries to capture 
opportunities that may result in positive (upside) returns and to balance 
against negative (downside) occurrences (Nocco & Stulz, 2006).  The 
theory that risk-taking could allow for comparative advantage for firms 
with private information was discussed by Stulz (1996).  Stulz espoused 
the idea of performing a “risk-taking audit” as a means to reveal 
opportunities that the organization would pursue upside benefits or would 
not pursue due to downside effects.  His ideas focus on the practice of 
minimizing volatility through risk management, rather than capitalizing on 
comparative advantage through the use of private information to achieve 
upper-tail outcomes. 
 In a later work, Nocco and Stulz (2006) transformed the concept of the stand-
alone risk management effort to that of an integrated ERM approach, incorporating ideas 
such as the creation of a risk champion or leader who might serve as chief risk officer 
(CRO) and the importance of the board’s involvement in risk oversight.  The authors 
discussed the macro and micro benefits of ERM and argued that ERM adds value to the 
shareholders.  Nocco and Stulz (2006, p. 9) further stated that “companies are in business 





and desirable to achieve positive results from taking upside risks.  Their arguments 
illustrate the importance of integrating risk management with strategy planning and 
execution.  
 The majority of literature on ERM has considered specific ERM practices in 
isolation (i.e., presence of a CRO or a risk committee), rather than examining a composite 
of ERM practices to capture the holistic implementation effectiveness of a number of 
ERM activities. While there are methodological advantages from examining such 
practices in isolation, ERM practices work together in an interconnected manner across 
both horizontal and vertical functional areas and processes (Beasley et al., 2015).  In 
other words, the risk management practices that constitute a firm’s ERM are inter-
dependent and their effectiveness depends on the strength of their integration (COSO 
2004).  The remainder of this section presents an in-depth literature review of ERM, 
focusing on the progression of ERM practice and research from a control-oriented 
philosophy to that of a set of mature processes.  The literature review provides a 
backdrop to supporting theories and hypotheses about ERM processes as a whole.  
Supporting Theory 
Agency Theory. 
 The most utilized supporting theory, not only for ERM but governance research 
overall, is agency theory.  The conflict that exists between the risk-takers (shareholders) 
and the decision makers (management) of organizations was the topic of an essay by 
Fama & Jensen (1983).  Many subsequent theories evolved from agency theory, 





considers the balance needed in the principal and agent relationship, which is an idea well 
suited to the study of ERM. 
 Most of the regulations that have related to ERM imposed by regulators and 
exchanges are consistent with agency theory.  The NYSE began requiring the audit 
committee to oversee management’s risk management and risk assessment processes in 
2004 (NYSE, 2004) as part of the exchange’s enhanced governance rules, and the SEC 
began mandating disclosure of the board’s role in risk oversight in 2010 (SEC, 2009).  
Additionally, credit rating agencies such as S&P evaluate the board’s overall engagement 
in governance activities, as reflected by seven of S&P’s 15 “management and 
governance” factors, as part of the overall credit-rating assessment process (S&P, 2012). 
 Setting the risk appetite of an organization is an important component in the 
implementation of ERM that utilizes agency theory (COSO, 2004).  The process of 
setting the risk appetite gives the board of directors the opportunity to balance the risk-
taking propensities of management with those of stakeholders.  This process utilizes the 
board of directors as a monitoring tool to effectively control management’s risk-taking 
behavior.  
 While the establishment of an entity’s overall risk appetite is an important 
component of ERM, the frequency of practice is not clear.  Less than one-third of the 
firms surveyed by Beasley, Branson, and Hancock (2015) responded that risk appetite 
assessment is “mostly” or “extensively” being practiced within strategic planning.  This 
trend indicates the importance of establishing the entity’s overall appetite for risk taking 
as part of driving the strategic risk direction of the firm is not occurring frequently.  





determining risk appetite will be included as part of the creation of a board-level ERM 
engagement index, which should help practitioners, regulators, and researchers to better 
understand the frequency of participation of the board in this process as reflected through 
disclosure. 
 Institutional Theory. 
 Institutional theory, also referred to as institutional isomorphism, has been used in 
conjunction with ERM.  The theory of institutional isomorphism was studied by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who proposed that organizations become more alike as they 
evolve.  The authors defined three distinct types of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and 
normative.   
 Coercive isomorphism is primarily associated with the change required or 
expected by entities outside of the organization.  One illustration of coercive 
isomorphism comes from Canadian listed companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE) (Kleffner, Lee, & McGannon, 2003).  The TSE began requiring companies listed 
to disclose and justify any variations from their corporate governance guidelines, 
including the board of directors taking responsibility for strategic planning and risk 
management (Kleffner et al., 2003).    
 Coercive isomorphism is also illustrated by the audit committee requirements 
mandated by SOX (2002), which created a homogenous external view of audit committee 
characteristics such as audit committee independence and financial expertise utilized by 
academic researchers (Carcello, Hermanson, & Ye, 2011).  The literature review 
conducted by Carcello et al. (2011) pondered whether the continuing drive toward 





research opportunities in the field.  The embrace of ERM by companies could likely be 
mechanical in such an environment, with practices being very similar as companies learn 
from the ERM disclosures made by their peers.  Disclosures could then likely become 
more similar over time with little incremental value of information for those disclosure 
users. 
 Mimetic isomorphism occurs when an organization imitates the efforts of others 
to bring solutions to problems and drive legitimacy.  The gathering of information 
concerning ERM implementation successes and failures can enable organizations to enact 
ERM in an efficient and effective manner.  Audit committee members interviewed by 
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal (2009) reveal a mix of mimetic actions taken by 
organizations for providing improved audit committee practices.  The authors also found 
some audit committees put best practices in place to provide “ceremonial legitimacy.”  
Similar mixes of substantive and ceremonial actions were explained by mimetic 
isomorphism in companies implementing ERM by Viscelli et al. (2015b). 
 Normative isomorphism was defined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as 
occurring when the “professionalization” of a particular strategy occurs.  
Professionalization occurs when a field legitimizes a practice and begins to educate 
members of that profession, both formally and informally, about these practices.  ERM 
education occurs quite frequently and is part of many graduate and undergraduate college 
accounting, finance, and management programs (North Carolina State University, 2016).  
Further reinforcement of ERM knowledge and research is provided by research and 
thought centers such as the Enterprise Risk Management Initiative at North Carolina 





information has been written and shared in conferences directed at best practices for 
directors.  Given that all boards have been educated about their responsibilities for more 
enhanced risk oversight, the practice of board level ERM can be deemed consistent with 
normative isomorphism.  The proliferation and sharing of these ERM best practices by 
board members holding multiple directorships is also an example of normative 
isomorphism. 
 Institutional theory, rather than the overarching responsibility of the board of 
directors to protect the shareholders, may provide a reason why some organizations adopt 
ERM for ceremonial reasons (Beasley, Branson, & Pagach, 2015).  This research appears 
to support some organizations trying to utilize institutional theory to achieve ceremonial 
objectives while others are attempting to adopt a “best practices” approach.  Some 
organizations will promote their ERM efforts to others as mature, while simply going 
through the motions of implementation and operation.  Other organizations will choose to 
adopt the best practices of other organizations in order to implement their ERM systems 
quicker.  The downfall of adopting best practices is that ERM is not a one size fits all 
strategy.  The implementation and reasoning behind the implementation need to fit the 
organization’s structure, resources, and strategy.   
Resource Dependence Theory. 
 Resource dependence theory takes the concept of an organization utilizing its 
resources to navigate through changes occurring in the external environment.  The theory 
in its original form has five separate applications (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), one of 





organization is one that is organismic, requiring the organization, and therefore the board 
of directors’ makeup, to evolve as the external environment changes. 
 The board of directors is viewed by resource dependency theory as a mechanism 
for accessing resources from outside the organization, thereby strengthening the ability of 
the organization to react to external risks, and even seize opportunities when these events 
occur (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009).  The literature reviewed by Hillman et al. 
(2009) discussed board characteristics such as size and composition, and discussed board 
size being a factor in improving board abilities, but focused on the composition of the 
board as being an important component for the firm. Hillman et al. (2009) stated that 
diversity and size of the board should be reflective of the current and evolving needs of 
the organization.  As the composition of the board is optimized, the ability of the 
organization to benefit from management and the board of directors influencing strategy 
is increased.  This concept is consistent with ERM being integrated with strategy, as 
management and the board work together in this effort. 
 The integration of agency and resource dependence theories was discussed by 
Hillman & Dalziel (2003), who contended that monitoring (agency) and providing 
resources (resource dependence) are not mutually exclusive in well-functioning boards of 
directors.  They merged the two concepts into one called “board capital.”   An integrated 
agency and resource dependence view is relevant in the ERM context as a board’s role 
here may include monitoring a variety of risks such as risks in internal controls and 
financial reporting (agency view) and developing strategies in response to risk-taking 
opportunities to enhance firm performance and value (resource dependence view).  Firm 





 Application of resource dependence theory to accounting research was inspired by 
Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2002) and empirically implemented by Sharma 
(2006).    These authors, together with Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2008), and 
Sharma, Boo, and Sharma (2008) argue that accounting research needs to evolve beyond 
the sole utilization of agency theory as the single theoretical construct to explain 
associations observed in corporate governance research.  They posit that resource 
dependence theory can also explain associations between various firm and audit 
outcomes, and governance characteristics (e.g., board members’ individual 
characteristics, board and audit committee structure, board independence).  Beasley et al. 
(2015) observed that resource dependence theory explained the understanding and 
maturity of ERM in some of the organizations surveyed in their study.  Agency, 
institutional and resource dependence theories are all used to explain the adoption and 
ongoing evolution of ERM within organizations.  This section will now focus on prior 
research efforts on ERM. 
Prior Research on ERM 
 The value of ERM efforts for companies, their investors and auditors have 
received limited (although increasing) attention from academic researchers over the last 
decade, despite ERM’s intended ability to help organizations navigate risks associated 
with ever-increasing complexity.  Prior research concerning ERM primarily addresses 
two overarching research questions.  The first research question is determining the factors 





determining the value of ERM.  Prior ERM research has also evolved as practice has 
advanced2. 
 The initial indicator of the presence of ERM used in the prior research was the 
appointment of a CRO.  Several studies attempted to find the determinants of companies 
that appointed a CRO3.  Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) and Pagach and Warr (2011) find 
highly leveraged firms are more likely to appoint a CRO.  Pagach and Warr (2011) also 
find that firms with poor stock performance and firms with CEO compensation sensitive 
to earnings volatility are more likely to hire a CRO.  Iyer, Rogers, and Simkin (2010) 
conclude in their review of ERM studies that relatively few U.S. companies have 
appointed a CRO, and question the use of the CRO variable as an indicator of ERM 
effort. 
 Parties both within and external to the firm have questioned the value of ERM.  
Several studies examine whether investors value ERM (Baxter et al., 2013; Beasley et al., 
2008; Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; McShane et al., 2011).  Tobin’s Q was utilized as a 
dependent variable by Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) to understand how the market values 
ERM for insurance companies.  The authors found that companies with ERM displayed 
approximately a 20% premium in firm value (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011).   
 Beasley et al. (2008) examined market responses to the announcement of the 
appointment of a CRO.  While the authors did not find significance for the sample as a 
whole, they did find that for non-financial firms the market’s reactions to the 
announcement of CROs is affected by firm size, earnings volatility, leverage, and 
liquidity. The market’s reaction to the announcement of a CRO appointment is greater for 
                                                          
2 An extensive analysis of prior ERM work can be found in Viscelli, Beasley, and Hermanson (2015b). 
3 It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the determinants of board-level ERM disclosure, but it 





larger firms and firms with higher volatility of earnings.  The market’s reaction is also 
greater as the degree of financial leverage decreases.  The market’s reaction to CRO 
appointment is greater when cash liquidity is lower.  A unique contribution of their study 
was to identify a pattern of significant findings that differed between financial and non-
financial companies, and it demonstrated that the value of ERM may be associated with 
the nature and extent of risks facing the organization. 
The credit rating agencies, particularly S&P, are now evaluating entities’ overall 
risk oversight processes as part of their credit rating assessments, and some of their 
assessments are now publicly available (mostly for insurance companies). Information 
from the S&P ERM quality ratings allowed new information and insights into levels of 
ERM implementation.  The quality ratings provided by S&P for insurance companies4 
were utilized by McShane et al. (2011) to understand the association between levels of 
ERM implementation maturity and firm value.  McShane et al. (2011) found additional 
market value being attributed to firms that attained the first three levels of ERM maturity 
on the credit rating agency’s scale but did not find additional firm value for firms 
attaining the two highest, which they judged as equivalent to a mature ERM 
implementation. 
 A second study utilizing the S&P ERM ratings for banks and insurers was 
conducted by Baxter et al. (2013). The authors’ intent was to understand the association 
between firm value and the levels of rating factors.  The ERM data and ratings by S&P at 
the time of their study only included insurance and bank companies5.  A positive and 
                                                          
4 S&P defines the five rating levels for insurers as weak, adequate, adequate with a positive trend, strong, 
and excellent (S&P, 2012). 
5 Baxter et al. (2013) utilized the S&P Ratings Direct database that covered banking and insurance 





significant association was found between the ERM quality factor based on the S&P 
assessment and firm value, which the authors interpreted as firms attaining higher levels 
of ERM quality having higher firm value. While the results of McShane et al. (2011) and 
Baxter et al. (2013) were somewhat conflicting, they both provide insight into the 
association between firm value and different levels of ERM implementation maturity. 
 The level of implementation maturity is key to ERM processes attaining a 
strategic (resource dependence theory), agency, or “ceremonial” (institutional theory) 
focus.  The resource dependence perspective would indicate the involvement of the board 
of directors and management to integrate business strategy with ERM processes.  The 
agency theory perspective would be an indication of the organization’s level of ERM 
maturity and that maturity level’s impact on the quality of monitoring. The institutional 
theory (isomorphic) perspective may indicate that ERM is being adopted for coercive, 
mimetic, or normative reasons. Works in both the professional (Beasley et al., 2009; 
NYSE, 2004) and academic literature (Beasley, Branson, & Hancock, 2015; Beasley, 
Branson, and Pagach, 2015) began to focus on the board of director’s role in risk 
oversight. 
 In 2004, the NYSE promulgated rules requiring the audit committee to provide 
oversight concerning management’s risk practices (Beasley, Branson, & Hancock, 2009; 
NYSE, 2004).  The Toronto Stock Exchange began requiring listed companies in 2003 to 
disclose their compliance with published guidelines concerning risk management, and to 
explain any variances in those disclosures (Kleffner, Lee, and McGannon, 2003).  The 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission began requiring disclosure of the board’s role 
                                                                                                                                                                             
adequate, strong, or excellent.  Due to the majority of the firms falling into the adequate category, Baxter et 
al. (2013) divided the adequate rating into strong-adequate, adequate, and weak-adequate categories.  This 





in risk oversight in annual proxy statements filed by U.S. publicly held companies in 
early 2010 (SEC, 2009).  These required changes significantly emphasized responsibility 
for the risk oversight process and disclosure of those efforts to the board of directors. 
While these changes have been in place for a few years, a minimal amount of research 
has focused on the nature and extent of the board’s activities in regards to risk oversight 
and it has not examined extensively whether those board activities are value-adding. 
 As more organizations attained a higher level of ERM maturity, studies evolved 
to focus on whether ERM provides strategic value beyond a mere compliance or 
regulatory perspective.   The COSO ERM Framework emphasizes the importance of 
ERM in helping the entity consider risks in the context of strategy-setting with the goal of 
increasing the likelihood the entity achieves its strategic objectives. The alignment of 
ERM with strategy is generally signaled by significant participation and input from the 
board of directors and management, rather than by an approach to risk management that 
has mostly a compliance attitude with little board involvement (Viscelli et al., 2015b).  
The authors note that while interviewees in their study indicated their organizations 
originally intended to utilize ERM as a part of the strategic management process, over 
half of the organizations had only partially attained the strategic value from their ERM 
efforts.  Individual responses collected by Viscelli et al. (2015b) indicate that many felt 
their firms’ level of implementation had not incorporated strategy as part of their ERM 
processes. These responses may indicate that further time and experience may be needed 
to allow organizations to attain the strategic benefits of ERM for their organizations or it 





 The strategic impact of ERM was further investigated by Beasley et al. (2015) 
who employed a survey to better understand how firms utilize ERM to provide strategic 
value to their organizations.  The authors found that as the number of board of director 
and senior executive ERM related processes increased, the likelihood that the 
organizations were finding strategic benefit from their ERM efforts also increased. For 
example, they found that “organizations that articulated their appetite for risks in the 
context of strategic planning and whose boards of directors receive a formal report from 
management at least annually that describes the entity’s top risk exposures” (Beasley et 
al., 2015) indicated a growing perception of ERM as a strategic tool.  The study also 
finds that organizations having a management-level risk committee, with a formal ERM 
training program for management, and that frequently update their risk inventories were 
most likely to contribute to management level perception of ERM as a strategic tool.   
 Beasley et al. (2015) also found that larger firms were more likely to perceive 
ERM as a strategic tool and that there is an association between a greater number of 
board-level risk activities and the perception of strategic value.  The importance of the 
strategic objective of ERM is tied closely to a resource dependence view for board 
oversight, allowing for the board of directors to act in a proactive manner and partner 
with management on appropriate issues, rather than acting solely in a monitoring 
capacity.  The linkage between the level of ERM maturity and an integration of strategic 
and ERM processes has become clearer as this stream of research continues to grow. 
 Edmonds, Edmonds, Leece, and Vermeer (2015) found that firms with a higher 
rating based on their quality risk management index display a lower variance of earnings.  





the ERM governance guidance provided by COSO (2004).  The study also finds that the 
results are more pronounced for companies experiencing losses.  These findings are 
important as they measure the efforts of board-level ERM oversight. 
While ERM processes continue to mature, the questions revolving around the 
relationship between firm value and ERM (Baxter et al., 2013; Beasley et al., 2008; Hoyt 
& Liebenberg, 2011; McShane et al., 2011; Edmonds et al., 2015), external ratings of 
ERM program quality by ratings organizations (McShane et al., 2011; Baxter et al., 
2013), and evolution of ERM within firms to attain strategic objectives (Beasley et al., 
2015; Viscelli et al., 2015a) are incomplete and sometimes conflicting.  Many questions 
remain concerning the benefits and costs of a mature ERM program. An important 
component of this study is to better understand what boards are actually doing in risk 
oversight and whether greater board involvement has an impact on different firm 
outcome measures.  The review of prior literature will next focus on auditors’ use of 
ERM information in the risk assessment process. 
Prior Research on Auditors’ Use of ERM Information in the Risk Assessment Process 
 Little research has been done to understand how auditors process information 
about their client’s ERM activities in assessing risks of misstatements on the financial 
reporting process and designing audit responses to those risks.  Management of publicly-
held companies and auditors of large accelerated filers are required to provide an 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting.  Most 
companies conduct that assessment using COSO’s Internal Control - Integrated 
Framework (COSO, 1992, COSO, 2013) as their benchmark.  One of the components of 





evaluate the entity’s risk assessment processes as part of their internal control evaluation 
process (COSO, 2013).  As a number of organizations are embracing ERM to enhance 
their risk assessment processes including those related to internal control, auditors may 
factor ERM into their risk assessment evaluations (Viscelli et al., 2015a). 
 Despite calls by COSO to investigate the effect of a company’s ERM processes 
on an auditor’s understanding of the client’s environment and assessment of risk 
(Landsittel & Rittenberg, 2010), only a few studies have addressed this important issue.  
 Early studies produced conflicting results about auditors’ consideration of 
governance factors in their risk assessment process (Cohen & Hanno, 2000; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, and Wright, 2002; Sharma et al., 2008).  Management’s philosophy on 
internal controls and corporate governance were compared in an experiment by Cohen 
and Hanno (2000).  The authors found that while both factors were important, 
management philosophy on internal controls had a greater impact on audit pre-planning 
decisions.   
 An experiment utilizing Big 4 audit managers in Singapore was conducted by 
Sharma et al. (2008).  The authors chose this setting after the Singapore Stock Exchange 
enacted a voluntary Code of Corporate Governance.  One component of their experiment 
tested the association between voluntary corporate governance measures and assessment 
of the clients’ control environment and revealed that auditors assess control risk lower 
when corporate governance was stronger (Sharma et al., 2008). 
 A semi-structured interview technique was utilized by Cohen et al., (2002) to 
better understand the thought process auditors follow when making client acceptance and 





information in their decision-making process.  However, many of the auditors felt that the 
board merely represented management, and that audit committees were largely passive in 
executing their duties (Cohen et al., 2002).  This view appears to counter and somewhat 
cloud the previous findings of Cohen and Hanno (2000), which indicated both 
management control philosophy and corporate governance systems were valuable to 
auditors. 
 Upon examining how auditors assess risk based on the characteristics of the board 
of directors, Cohen et al. (2007) focused on determining whether auditors would assess 
risk differently for a board that had a strong or weak agency theory and/or a strong or 
weak resource dependence focus.  The experiment found that auditors assess control risk 
higher when the board displayed a weak agency or weak resource dependence role.  The 
study also found that the control risk assessment and planned audit hours were lower 
when the auditor perceived the board to display both a strong agency and resource 
dependence role (Cohen et al., 2007).  This research shows the importance of the balance 
a board plays between the agency and resource dependence roles and how they affect 
auditors in the audit risk assessment process. 
 A semi-structured interview process was utilized to understand the linkage 
between ERM and the financial reporting process by Cohen et al. (2014).  The chief 
financial officer, an audit committee member, and the external audit partner responsible 
for their account were interviewed for each of the eleven companies.  The interview 
process revealed that all three sets of respondents associated risk identification and 
assessment, along with the ability to achieve operational efficiency and effectiveness with 





ERM.  This lack of discussion by auditors may indicate they are viewing only downside 
risk in their assessment of risks of material misstatements to the financial statements and 
not considering the upside risk that the strategic objective of ERM can take.  These 
research findings are in line with viewing the board of directors and the ERM effort as 
being an agency control, rather than a resource dependence view.  As risks are 
interrelated across silos, a strategic risk taken in a supply-chain decision could ultimately 
affect the financial statements in a positive or negative manner.  Organizations addressing 
risks should indicate an organization that understands and attempts to utilize its risks in a 
positive manner.  Viscelli et al. (2015a) theorized that the lack of consideration of ERM 
in the auditor’s risk assessment process may be due to the number of companies that fail 
to implement mature ERM processes that integrate strategy.  
 Empirical research on the association between the presence of board-level risk 
committees and audit pricing was conducted by Hines, Masli, Mauldin, and Peters 
(2015).  The authors utilized secondary data to study the association between the 
presence of risk committees and audit fees in banks.  The authors found that the presence 
of a risk committee in banks is associated with higher audit fees.  They further discovered 
that independence of the risk committee and overlapping membership with the audit 
committee resulted in lower audit fees, while risk committee size, in proportion to the 
total board, is associated with higher audit fees.  While the presence of a risk committee 
is only one factor in the ERM processes that may be utilized by a company, the 






 The evidence in the literature to date is not clear regarding whether auditors 
utilize information about a firm’s ERM in the assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement and the assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial 
reporting.  In addition, findings by Cohen et al. (2007 & 2014) indicate that auditors may 
not fully understand the benefits of ERM or they may be discounting ERM because it is 
not perceived as a substantive risk management system but as a ceremonial program.  An 
alternate explanation occurs when the auditor does not see the connection between ERM 
and the risk of material misstatements in the financial statements.  The next section will 
focus on the application of theory and construction of hypotheses. 
Hypotheses Development 
Internal Value of ERM. 
 Early research has focused on the external value of ERM, which is the value of 
ERM to external shareholders.  Subsequent research concerning the implementation and 
operation of ERM processes revealed that many individuals inside an organization 
question the value of ERM efforts to the company (Viscelli et al., 2015b).  This value to 
companies and their operations is hereafter referred to as internal value.  COSO (2004) 
envisioned the ERM process to be holistic and overarching for the organization based on 
the view that processes do not add value when applied in a singular manner, but rather 
the combination of all of the ERM processes combined define the strength of the ERM 
implementation.  Board engagement is key in those processes and was defined as a key 
driver in early implementation projects (Viscelli et al., 2015b).  Initial implementations of 
ERM focused heavily on extending controls to mitigate risks, consistent with principles 





opportunities. As the maturity level of ERM evolves, a strategic focus should emerge, 
combining strategic planning and executive processes with ERM processes (Viscelli, 
2015b).   
 One outcome that is expected when mature ERM processes are in place is the 
alignment of the firm’s mission/vision with its operational, reporting, and compliance 
objectives (COSO, 2004). This outcome and the related objectives are consistent with 
both agency (monitoring) and resource dependency theories.  This allows for the 
hypotheses in this study to be more theory driven.  COSO specifically states that the 
“strategic objectives reflect management’s choice as to how the entity will seek to create 
value for its stakeholders” (COSO, 2004, p. 35).  As the board of directors becomes more 
active in oversight of ERM, those processes should be strengthened so that the number of 
operational surprises should be fewer as risks and opportunities can be identified and 
remedied or seized on a more proactive basis.  An organization with fewer operational 
surprises should display more consistent financial results unless boards engage in ERM 
for ceremonial or institutional theory reasons.  Accordingly, I propose that fewer 
operational surprises that might impact measures of performance and more consistent 
financial results would manifest in less volatile earnings:   
 H1: The level of board engagement in ERM oversight is negatively associated 
with  fluctuations in earnings. 
  
External Value of ERM. 
 Research results about the value of ERM to investors have been mixed.  Some 





that investors place a higher value on firms that are implementing lower levels of ERM, 
but do not place additional value on firms that attain higher levels of ERM quality.  
Classifying ERM as an agency cost implies that the ERM effort simply raises monitoring 
costs while doing little to help with the diversification of risk.  This view treats 
diversification of risk as something investors prefer to accomplish via a diversified 
investment portfolio rather than through higher quality ERM at the firm level.  This 
practice would indicate minimal market premium being given by investors for higher 
levels of ERM quality (McShane et al., 2011). 
 Other research has suggested that ERM is value-adding by finding that the level 
of ERM effort is associated with a higher market value (Baxter et al., 2013; Hoyt & 
Liebenberg, 2011).  Baxter et al. (2013) find a positive association between the quality of 
the ERM program and firm value.  The findings by Baxter et al. (2013) are consistent 
with earlier studies by Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011).  The findings of these studies 
suggest that investors may have confidence in ERM to actually assess and respond to 
risks, and also seize opportunities with possible upside outcomes consistent with resource 
dependence theory.  Based on the progress of firms’ ERM maturity and disclosures, and 
the results of Baxter et al. (2013) and Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011), I propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 H2: The level of board engagement in ERM oversight is positively associated 
with firm value. 
 





 Scant research has been accomplished on the auditor’s use of ERM information in 
the risk assessment process, despite encouragement from organizations such as COSO 
(Landsittel & Rittenberg, 2010).  The research that has been conducted provides 
conflicting findings.  One viewpoint may be that auditors view the ERM framework as an 
extension of the COSO Internal Control Framework, and therefore consider it an agency 
monitoring mechanism.  That would indicate a lack of consideration for the upside 
possibilities that could indicate a firm assesses and responds to risk in a proactive 
manner, thereby controlling risk to a higher degree.  An alternate explanation may be that 
auditors only assess and respond to risks of material misstatements to financial 
statements, and may not utilize the level of engagement for ERM oversight efforts put in 
place by the board of directors as a part of that assessment process. 
 While Cohen et al. (2007) document the benefit of having a strong agency and 
resource dependence capability on a board, Cohen et al. (2014) discover that most 
auditors do not incorporate the integration of strategy and ERM into their audit risk 
assessments.  Hines et al. (2015) find a significant positive association between the 
presence of a risk committee and audit fees.  These findings, which conflict between 
archival, survey-based and interview-based research methodologies, leave an important 
question to be answered.   
Viscelli et al. (2015a) state that “variation in the robustness and strategic impact 
of management’s risk assessment processes across organizations should be important to 
auditors, who are responsible for understanding the entity’s risk assessment component of 
internal control as a part of audit planning.”  The findings of Hines et al. (2015) further 





demand for better risk management and internal control structure could lead an 
organization to demand a higher quality audit, therefore increasing audit fees.  In 
contrast, stronger risk management efforts by the board of directors could indicate a 
stronger risk management and internal control environment to the auditor, which could 
lead them to assess risk at a lower level.  Since the literature is not clear on the nature of 
the link between ERM and auditor effort, I offer the following non-directional null 
hypothesis: 
 H3: There is no association between the level of board engagement in ERM 
oversight and client risk assessment by the external auditor. 
  
 Taken together, the three hypotheses of this study explore the constructs of board-
level engagement in ERM processes, the effect of ERM on a company’s earnings 
volatility, the value that investors place on ERM, and the use of ERM information by 
auditors.  The next section presents the research method including the sample, design, 





III. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The Sample 
 To analyze the association between the board-level ERM index and earnings 
volatility and firm value, and the association between the ERM index and the auditor’s 
pricing decisions, I obtained firm ERM disclosure, financial, financial reporting risk, and 
audit fee data for the period 2010 to 2014 for U.S. publicly listed companies in the S&P 
5006.  The first year selected was 2010 in order to coincide with the initial SEC 
requirement to disclose board-level risk oversight in proxy disclosures.  The five years 
represent all full years available at the time of data collection.  The reasoning behind 
utilizing 500 of the largest publicly-traded companies for this study is that larger firms 
have the propensity and ability to adopt complex systems such as ERM (Beasley & Frigo, 
2010).  In addition, since the board-level ERM oversight disclosure data will be hand-
collected from proxy statements, limiting the sample to the S&P 500 is efficient. 
 Panel A of Table 1 outlines the sample selection procedure.  The initial proxy 
sample is 2,505 firm-year observations for proxy issuance years from 2010 to 2014.  
Observations where no risk oversight disclosure was provided in the proxy (35 
observations) are excluded.  I further excluded observations with missing financial data 
in Compustat (138) and the GMI Corporate Governance database7 (18 observations). 
                                                          
6 The S&P 500 is a market index of 500 large-cap U.S. equities.  The index is recognized as one of the 
leading indicators for the large-cap U.S. market. 
7 The GMI Corporate database was utilized to extract information related to board characteristics, CEO 





Additionally, 45 observations were removed due to the exclusion of rare events among 
the S&P 5008 and five observations related to one company were removed due to outlier 
observation.9  The final sample comprises 2,264 observations. Panel B of Table 1 shows 
the industry membership of the sample assigned on the basis of the Fama and French 10 
Industry Classification (1997). 
 As the study relies on disclosures about the board’s risk oversight processes in 
proxy statements, the sample begins with 2010 to coincide with the first year the SEC 
risk oversight disclosure rules became effective for U.S. publicly-held companies.10  The 
SEC states that “the new rules will improve corporate disclosure regarding risk, 
compensation, and corporate governance matters when voting decisions are made” (SEC, 
2009, p. 1).  This sample will be illustrative of the disclosures that companies choose to 
make under these rules. 
I started the data collection process by obtaining board risk oversight disclosure 
data from annual proxies for the companies that comprise the S&P 500 index for the five-
year period.  The proxies were extracted from the SEC EDGAR database utilizing the 
directEDGAR (Kealey, 2016) software application.  The risk management section was 
detected by searching for keywords beginning with phrases such as “Role in Risk  
                                                          
8 Certain variables and observations were removed due to a low occurrence in the sample.  The 45 instances 
where records were removed are comprised of the following occurrences: Nine records where a material 
internal control weakness was reported, five records where a restatement occurred, nine records having a 
non-Big 4 auditor, 16 where an auditor change occurred, and 25 where an auditor was performing the initial 
audit.  Additionally, several of the records had more than one of these occurrences, therefore 45 
observations were removed. 
9 These five records relate to Berkshire Hathaway.  The earning per share variable was very large due to the 
few number of shares and very high value per share of this company in relation to the remainder of the 
sample.  Winsorization was attempted as an alternate procedure to exclusion of this outlier at the first and 
ninety-ninth percentile levels.  The results with winsorization including the five outlier records were less 
significant than the unwinsorized sample with the five records removed, which is consistent with Lien and 
Balakrishnan (2005). 
10 The SEC issued new rules requiring additional disclosures concerning risk, compensation, and corporate 
governance effective February 28, 2010 (Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, and Feld, LLP, 2010; U. S. 





Table 1 – Sample Selection and Industry Membership 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection       
 Total 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Initial number of proxies 2,505 502 502 502 502 497 
  Less companies with no risk oversight disclosure 35 2 2 3 3 25 
  Adjusted disclosure sample 2,470 500 500 499 499 472 
  Less companies with missing data in Compustat 138 21 30 30 27 30 
  Less companies with missing data in GMI 18 3 5 8 1 1 
  Less companies removed due to rare events11     45 14 8 11 8 4 
  Less outlier (Berkshire Hathaway) 5 1 1 1 1 1 
Final Sample 2,264 461 456 449 462 436 
       
 






Industry Name  
Number 
of Firms  
% of 
Sample 
5  Technology  377  16.65 
3  Manufacturing  320  14.13 
7  Shops  235  10.38 
1  Non-Durable Goods  183  8.08 
9  Utilities  171  7.55 
4  Energy  161  7.11 
8  Healthcare  161  7.11 
6  Telecommunications  80  3.53 
2  Durable Goods  40  1.77 
10  All Other Industries  536  23.69 
Total Sample  46 industries  2,264  100.00 
 
  
                                                          
11 Certain variables and observations were removed due to a low occurrence in the sample.  The 45 
instances where records were removed are comprised of the following occurrences: Nine records where a 
material internal control weakness was reported, five records where a restatement occurred, nine records 
having a non-Big 4 auditor, 16 where an auditor change occurred, and 25 where an auditor was performing 
the initial audit.  Additionally, several of the records had more than one of these occurrences, therefore 






Oversight,” “Board’s Role in Risk Oversight,” “Risk Oversight,” and “Role in Risk 
Management.”  In the following step, I reviewed the extracted text from the ERM proxy 
statements and coded the disclosures for information about the detailed aspects of the 
firm’s ERM process and the board’s oversight activities. For example, I separately coded 
ERM components such as “existence of CRO,” “Audit Committee charged with primary 
responsibility for risk oversight,” “Sharing of risk responsibility across multiple 
committees,” and other ERM-related practices.  Each of the responses has been recorded 
by firm and year to create a matrix of ERM disclosure factors for evaluation. 
Board-Level ERM Engagement Index 
The ERM disclosure factors discovered during the analysis of the proxies were 
utilized to create the board-level engagement index for ERM.  The importance of this 
analysis to practice is to inform organizations of the ERM processes that other 
organizations utilize with most frequency, and potentially allow researchers to understand 
the key variables that should be studied as possible indicators of mature ERM 
implementations.   The eight factors discovered during the process of reading and coding 
the proxies varied from the board’s efforts to integrate ERM with the organization’s 
strategy to the committees that were utilized in the ERM process. 
Further review of the ERM oversight practices discovered during the coding 
process reveals that there is no single “magic” formula for ERM.  The complex process 
of ERM oversight by the board will vary from organization to organization, depending 
upon the level of ERM maturity, the organization's governance, and risk management 
structures.  The primary goal of the index is to better understand what practices are being 





understand their association with dependent variables such as variance of earnings (VE).  
The complete list of ERM disclosure factors discovered in the analysis of the proxy 
disclosures for ERM from 2010 to 2014 and the procedures utilized to obtain them are 
discussed in detail in Appendix A and the results are presented in Table A1. 
 Once the ERM factor matrix was complete, the board-level ERM engagement 
index was calculated.  Previous academic research on disclosures utilized several 
different methods to construct and analyze indices (Barth, McNichols & Wilson, 1997; 
Brown & Caylor, 2006).  Those methods include quality measures, the scope of the 
disclosure, and quantity of disclosure (Urquiza, Navarro & Trombetta, 2009). 
 Quality measures for index creation have typically been utilized when theories are 
developed around a topic such as financial disclosure (Barth et al., 1997).  Since no 
previous literature reviewing the quality of board-level risk oversight disclosures has 
been identified, this method has not been utilized. 
 Scope indices are created when a proportion is calculated by dividing the number 
of disclosure items for that firm-year instance by the total of all disclosure items 
(Botosan, 1997).  The resulting ratio indicates the relative proportion of that firm-year’s 
disclosures to all possible disclosures and indicates the relative strength of the 
disclosures.  I calculate scope measures for each of the sample firms. 
 Quantity indices are utilized to understand the amount of disclosure given.  Since 
this method may be the simplest of the three methods, it is regularly employed.  A 
quantity index is calculated by a simple sum of index factors (Brown & Caylor, 2006), a 
word count of the disclosure, or a sentence count of the disclosure.  A sentence count has 





may not be representative of the number of distinct thoughts represented.  An index, 
word, and sentence count has been calculated for each company-year disclosure.  It is 
important to note that the use of different index methods may result in different 
conclusions being drawn (Urquiza et al., 2009).  For the main analysis in this paper, a 
simple sum quantity index is utilized with multiple regression analysis for the initial 
testing.  Alternate analyses were also conducted with a sentence and word count quantity 
and scope indexes. 
 After completion of coding of the ERM factors, additional financial, financial 
risk, governance, and audit information was obtained from the Compustat North 
America, Compustat Segment, GMI Governance and Audit Analytics databases.  The 
information from those four sources was merged with the disclosure data.  Consistent 
with the findings from Beasley et al. (2008 & 2015), firms were coded for subsequent 
analysis of financial and non-financial firms as sub-groups, as the results in the financial 
industry are frequently different from those for non-financial firms. 
Empirical Model and Variables – Board-Level ERM Engagement Index and Internal 
Value of Firms 
 Consistent with prior ERM research (Beasley et al., 2008; Beasley et al., 2015; 
Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; McShane et al., 2011), multiple regression analysis was 
utilized to examine the association between the board-level ERM engagement index and 
the value of ERM as proxied by a measure of the volatility of earnings (VE).  This is the 
most appropriate method to use as the dependent variable is metric, and the test and 





relationship and containing multiple control variables that may influence this relationship 
based on the prior literature.  The specification of the equation is12: 
VEi,t = α0 + β1BODERMXi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVERAGEi,t 
+ β4GROWTHi,t + β5SEGMENTSi,t + β6FOROPSi,t + 
β7RESTRUCTUREi,t + β8MERGERi,t + β9CEODUALi,t + 
β10BOARDSIZEi,t + β11BOARDINDEPi,t + 
β12BOARDMEETi,t + β13PINSTi,t + β14AUDFEEi,t + 
β15NASi,t + Year Dummiesi,t + Industry Dummiesi,t + εi,t   
  
Dependent Variable. 
 The dependent variable is variance of earnings per share including extraordinary 
items for the current and previous year (VE), consistent with Beasley et al. (2008).  VE is 
also utilized by Edmonds, Edmonds, Leece, and Vermeer (2015).  This measure 
represents the earnings stream of the firm, without interference from market effects, 
which would be a primary ERM objective in the operational and strategic areas for 
management and the board of directors to consider.  Panel A of Table 2 describes the 
dependent variable. 
Test Variable. 
The effect from board-level ERM engagement was measured utilizing 
BODERMX.  As proposed in Hypothesis 1, the expected direction of this association 
with earnings volatility is negative, which would indicate that firms with more board-
level risk oversight processes are more likely to exhibit a lower volatility of earnings.  
Panel B of Table 2 describes the operational definition of the independent test variables. 
 
 
                                                          
12 The variables indicating the presence of material internal control weaknesses, a restatement, a BIG 4 







Table 2 – Variable Descriptions 
Panel A: Dependent Variables     




Variance of basic earnings per share including extraordinary 
items calculated for the current and previous year (Compustat 
# EPSPI). Variance is calculated as the sum of squared errors 
for the EPSPI variable for the two periods divided by N (total 




Tobin's Q - Ratio of market value of equity plus the book 
value of total liabilities to the book value of total assets. 
(Compustat # ((PRCC_F*CSHO) +LCT)/AT. 
AUDFEE  






The number of days between the financial year end date and 
the audit report date (Audit Analytics). 
 
   
Panel B: Independent Test Variables     
Variable Name VE/TQ/AUDFEE13             Variable Measurement (Source) 
BODERMX -/+/? 
Board-level ERM engagement index created by the sum of 
factors as documented in the Appendix.  Alternate analysis 
will utilize WORD, SENT, and SCOPE.  
BODERMX_1 -/+/? 
BODERMX with the substitution of the continuous variable 
REPT_FREQ being replaced with the following values: 1) No 
reporting frequency disclosed equals zero, 2) One report per 
year equals one, and 3) Any reporting frequency above 1 is set 
to a 2. 
WORD -/+/? 
The natural logarithm of the count of words in the company-
year disclosure. 
SENT -/+/? 
The natural logarithm of the count of sentences in the 
company-year proxy disclosure. 
SCOPE -/+/? 
The sum of variables calculated for BODERMX divided by 












                                                          
13 Variables marked with a directional sign of NR are not reported as those variables were not utilized in 






Panel C: Control Variables: Firm Controls 
   
Variable Name VE/TQ/AUDFEE Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
SIZE -/-/+ Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (Compustat 
#AT). 
LEVERAGE -/-/+ The ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Compustat 
#TL/AT). 
GROWTH ?/?/+ Current year sales less prior year sales divided by prior year 
sales (Compustat # Sale). 
ROA NR/+/NR Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets 
(Compustat #IB, AT). 
LOSS NR/NR/+ 1 if the firm experienced net losses in either of the last two 
years (current or previous) (Compustat # NI). 
SPITEMS NR/NR/+ Special items scaled by total assets (Compustat #SPI/AT). 
SEGMENTS +/+/+ The number of segments reported by an entity (Compustat 
Segments)  
FOROPS +/+/+ 1 if the firm discloses foreign exchange currencies utilized, 0 
otherwise (Compustat # FCA). 
LITIG NR/NR/+ 1 if the firm operates in a  litigious industry (SIC code ranges 
2833 to 2836, 3570 to 3577, 3600 to 3674, 5200 to 5961, and 
7370), 0 otherwise (Compustat). 
RESTRUCTURE +/+/+ 1 if the firm incurred any restructuring costs, 0 otherwise 
(Compustat #RCA, RCP). 
MERGER +/+/+ 1 if the firm engaged in merger and/or acquisition activity, 0 
otherwise (Compustat #AQP, AQA). 
DEISSUE NR/NR/+ 1 if the firm experienced a change of at least 10 percent in debt 
(Compustat #DLTT + #DLC) or equity (Compustat #CSHO, 0 
otherwise. 
Panel D: Control Variables: Governance Characteristics   
Variable Name VE/TQ/AUDFEE Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
CEODUAL +/+/- 1 if the CEO serves as chairman of the board, 0 otherwise 
(GMI Ratings). 
BOARDSIZE -/-/? The number of directors on the board (GMI Ratings). 
BOARDINDEP -/-/? Percentage of independent directors on the board (GMI 
Ratings). 
BOARDMEET -/-/? Natural logarithm of the number of meetings held by the board 
(GMI Ratings) 
BLOCK NR/NR/? Cumulative percentage shares held by block holders owning at 
least 5 percent of outstanding shares (GMI Ratings). 
PINST -/-/- 










Panel E: Control Variables: Audit Characteristics   
Variable Name VE/TQ/AUDFEE Variable Measurement (Source) 
   
NAS ?/?+ Natural logarithm of non-audit services fee in the current year 
(Audit Analytics). 
   
BUSY ?/?/NR 1 if the company’s fiscal year-end is either December or 
January (Compustat # FYR). 
 
Control Variables. 
 Several control variables are included based on prior ERM literature.  Larger 
firms have more resources and hence ability to implement quality programs such as ERM 
(Beasley et al., 2008; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Coles, Daniel & Naveen, 2008; Hoyt & 
Liebenberg, 2011; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003; McShane et al., 2011; Pagach & Warr, 
2011; Hines et al., 2015). Therefore, firm size is included as a control variable.  
Consistent with Hoyt & Liebenberg (2011), McShane et al. (2011), Pagach & Warr 
(2011), and Hines et al. (2015), the firm size control variable (SIZE) is measured using 
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
 The second control variable is leverage, which is also frequently utilized in ERM 
research (Baxter et al., 2013; Beasley et al., 2005; Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; McShane et 
al., 2011; Pagach & Warr, 2011).  Early research discovered that firms with more 
leverage are more likely to adopt ERM (Beasley et al., 2005; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003), 
although there have been mixed results related to the association of ERM and leverage.  
Following Baxter et al. (2013) and Pagach & Warr (2011), the measure for the leverage 
control variable (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total assets to total liabilities. 
 Growth is a variable (GROWTH) frequently controlled for in ERM research 





these studies were comprised of financial industry firms, the results are conflicting.  
McShane et al. (2013) found a negative and significant association between sales growth 
and ERM rating, while the other three aforementioned studies did not find a significant 
association.  Consistent with Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011), sales growth is defined as the 
change in sales year over year.  Return on Assets (ROA) is typically not utilized in a 
model with VE as the dependent variable (as in Hypothesis 1), as ROA and VE are both 
calculated using a measure of income.  ROA is utilized in the specification for 
Hypothesis 2 as Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable.     
 Firm complexity is also frequently utilized as a control variable in ERM studies.  
As the operating complexity of an organization rises, the quantity and complexity of the 
risks can rise, thereby potentially warranting greater risk oversight maturity.  Measures of 
complexity used in the literature include foreign operations (Baxter et al., 2013; 
Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003), number of SIC codes a company operates in (McShane et al., 
2011), the combined number of business and geographic segments a company reports 
(Baxter et al., 2013), and the number of operating segments a company reports (Pagach & 
Warr, 2011).  Following Baxter et al. (2013) and Pagach and Warr (2011), the number of 
operating segments (SEGMENTS) is used to measure operational complexity, and 
foreign currency translation (FOROPS) is used to measure foreign operations.  A firm 
undergoing restructuring (Naiker, Sharma, and Sharma, 2013) or performing merger 
activity (Naiker et al., 2013; Archumbalt, Dezoort, & Hermanson, 2008) may have 
increased cash flow and operational issues (restructuring), or be at higher risk of potential 
internal control weaknesses and restatements (merger).  Consistent with these studies, 





(RESTRUCTURE) or merger activity (MERGER).  Panel C of Table 2 describes the 
firm-related control variables14. 
 The governance section focuses on other factors in the firms’ structure that could 
affect the dependent variable and the association between the dependent and independent 
variables.  Due to the limited number of archival studies published in the ERM arena, and 
the few firm governance variables controlled for in those studies, I include variables 
utilized in seminal governance studies examining some form of firm risk. The 
governance variables widely studied and found to be important in the literature include 
CEO duality (CEODUAL) (Beasley 1996; Abbott et al., 2004), board size 
(BOARDSIZE) (Beasley 1996; Abbott et al., 2004; Naiker et al., 2013; Hines et al, 
2015), board independence (BOARDINDEP) (Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 2005; Hines 
et al., 2015), number of board meetings per year (BOARDMEET) (Naiker et al., 2013), 
and percentage of institutional ownership (PINST) (Sharma et al., 2008; Naiker et al., 
2013).  Panel D of Table 2 describes these governance-related control variables. 
 The audit related control variables will focus on other areas of monitoring that 
may have an effect on firm value/risk. These variables include current-year audit fees 
(AUDFEE) (Knechel & Sharma, 2012) listed under Panel A of Table 2.  A control 
variable related to the audit includes the fiscal year-end occurring in December or 
January to control for audit pricing effects during the peak audit season (BUSY) 
(Knechel & Sharma, 2012; Knechel & Payne, 2001) is listed in Panel E of Table 2.  
Additionally, fees for non-audit services (NAS) (Naiker et al., 2013) is listed in Panel E 
                                                          
14 Additional factors including ROA, LOSS, SPITEMS, LITIG, and DEISSUE are included in the firm 
controls section of Table 2.  These factors are discussed and motivated further in the appropriate section for 





of Table 2.  Additionally, industry and year indicator variables are included to control for 
year and industry fixed effects. 
Empirical Model and Variables – Board-Level ERM Engagement Index and External 
Value of Firms 
 As performed for Hypothesis 1, multiple regression analysis is utilized to examine 
the association between ERM characteristics and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q.  
The specification of the equation to be employed is15: 
TQi,t = α0 + β1BODERMXi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVERAGEi,t 
+ β4GROWTHi,t + β5ROA + β6SEGMENTSi,t + 
β7FOROPSi,t + β8RESTRUCTUREi,t + β9MERGERi,t + 
β10CEODUALi,t + β11BOARDSIZEi,t + 
β12BOARDINDEPi,t + β13BOARDMEETi,t + β14PINSTi,t + 
β15AUDFEEi,t + β16NASi,t + Year Dummiesi,t + Industry 
Dummiesi,t + εi,t 
 
Dependent Variable. 
 Previous studies concerning the value of ERM to the investor have utilized 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) to determine the change in stock returns revolving 
around the announcement of the appointment of an ERM event, such as the appointment 
of a CRO (Beasley et al., 2008) or the announcement of ratings by S&P (Baxter et al., 
2013).  Other studies have used Tobin’s Q as a measure of financial stability over a 
period of time when studying the announcement of an ERM event (Baxter et al., 2013; 
Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; McShane et al., 2011), such as the hiring of a CRO or the 
announcement of ERM ratings.  As the nature of this study focuses on ERM as a set of 
processes, and not a single event, Tobin’s Q is more appropriate as it captures market 
value over time.  Tobin’s Q (TQ) is defined as the market value of equity plus the book 
                                                          
15 As with the previous model, the variables indicating the presence of material internal control weaknesses, 





value of total liabilities divided by the book value of assets.  Panel A of Table 2 describes 
this dependent variable in more detail. 
 Test Variable. 
 The test variable employed in Hypothesis 1 is also utilized to analyze the 
association between board-level engagement with ERM and firm value measured by TQ.  
Hypothesis 2 focuses on the association between firm value (TQ) and the BODERMX.  
Panel B of Table 2 describes the test independent variable being examined. 
Control Variables. 
 Control variables for this equation are based on prior literature in the ERM, audit, 
and financial areas of study.  The general firm, financial, governance and audit controls 
are as previously defined, with the exception of the addition of return on assets (ROA) as 
a firm- level control variable (Baxter et al., 2013; Coles et al., 2008; Farrell & Gallagher, 
2014; Yermack, 1996). Panels C through E of Table 2 describe these control variables. 
Empirical Model and Variables – Board-Level ERM Engagement Index and Auditor Use 
of ERM 
 Multiple regression is utilized to examine the association between board-level 
ERM engagement and auditor’s consideration of ERM information as captured by audit 
fees.  In order to create a complete audit fee model for usage with BODERMX as the test 
variable, empirical research on the audit fee model was searched to determine variants of 
the model and identify control variables that are typically employed.  The specification of 
the equation employed is16: 
                                                          
16 As with the previous two models, the variables indicating the presence of material internal control 






AUDFEEi,t = α0 + β1BODERMXi,t + β2SIZEi,t + 
β3LEVERAGEi,t + β4GROWTHi,t + β5LOSSi,t + 
β6SPITEMSi,t + β7SEGMENTSi,t + β8FOROPSi,t + 
β9LITIGi,t + β10RESTRUCTUREi,t + β11MERGERi,t + 
β12DEISSUEi,t + β13CEODUALi,t + β14BOARDSIZEi,t + 
β15BOARDINDEPi,t + β16BOARDMEETi,t + β17BLOCKi,t 
+ β18PINSTi,t + β19BUSYi,t + β20NASi,t +Year Dummiesi,t + 
Industry Dummiesi,t + εi,t 
 
Dependent Variable. 
 Previous studies on the value of ERM information to the auditor utilize 
experimental (Cohen & Hanno 2000; Cohen et al., 2007) and interview (Cohen et al., 
2002; Cohen et al., 2014) research designs. As no previously published archival study 
investigates the auditor’s use of ERM information in the risk assessment process, audit 
fees and lagged audit fees are utilized to test whether the auditor utilizes information 
about ERM.  Prior literature uses audit fees to capture auditors’ pricing of client risk and 
effort expended during the audit.  Researchers use publicly available audit fee data as a 
proxy for risk because actual auditor risk assessment data are proprietary and not publicly 
available; auditors usually do not share audit work paper data due to client 
confidentiality. 
 Audit lag has been used in the literature as a proxy for audit timeliness and 
efficiency, which is a function of audit effort that can be used to capture client risk, and is 
measured as the number of days between the financial year-end date and the audit report 
date (e.g., Knechel & Payne, 2011; Tanyi, Raghunandan & Barua, 2010).  Audit lag 
(AUDLAG) is utilized as an alternate dependent variable.  Panel A of Table 2 describes 








 Since the test variable is the same as defined previously and the evidence on 
auditors’ use of ERM information is both sparse and mixed, Hypothesis 3 does not make 
a directional prediction on the association between auditor’s risk assessment (audit fees) 
and the BODERMX test variable.  Panel B of Table 2 describes the test independent 
variable.  
Control Variables. 
 Control variables for this equation are based on prior literature on audit fees, 
ERM, and financial reporting risk.  The control variables are as previously defined for 
Hypotheses 1, with the addition of the following control variables, which are consistent 
with the audit fee literature.  The additional variables related to firm controls include an 
operating loss in either of the two previous years (LOSS) (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, 
and Riley, 2002; Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright, 2014), operating in a 
litigious industry (LITIG) (Cohen et al., 2014), experiencing a change of 10% of either 
debt or equity (DEISSUE) (Naiker et al., 2013), and the reporting of special items 
(Naiker et al., 2013).  An additional control variable related to governance includes the 
percentage of stock owned by block holders (BLOCK) (Naiker et al., 2013).  ROA is 
typically not utilized in audit fee models, and accordingly, is not included in this model 






 Panel A of Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the variance of earnings (VE), 
Tobin’s Q (TQ), audit fees (AUDFEE), and audit lag (AUDLAG) across the sample.  On 
average (median), firms in the full sample display a variance of earnings of 5.558 (0.198).  
The variance of earnings indicates the variance17 between the current and previous year’s 
basic earnings per share including extraordinary items.  The average VE for the sample is 
$5.56.  The sample firms have an average (median) TQ of 1.535 (1.205).  A Tobin’s Q 
ratio in excess of one indicates that the market value of the companies’ stock is greater 
than the book value of the assets for those firms.  Audit fees display an average (median) 
value of $8,069,065 ($4,978,500) for company-years in the full sample.  The natural 
logarithm of the current-year audit fees is an average (median) of 15.459 (15.421).  The 
days of audit lag (AUDLAG) are an average (median) of 51.785 (54.000) days for the 
sample.  The average audit lag of approximately 52 days indicates that most audit firms 
represented in this sample are able to file an audit report for their clients on a timely 
basis.  The 52-day average is less than the 60-day 10-K filing requirement imposed by the
                                                          
17 The variance calculation takes the sum of squared errors (difference from mean, squared) and divides by 






Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Variable Mean Median SD Quartile 1 Quartile 3 
VE 5.558 0.198 34.180 0.036 1.232 
TQ 1.535 1.205 1.248 0.734 1.911 
Audit Fees ($) 8,069,065 4,978,500 10,510,323 2,789,000 9,088,750 
AUDFEE  15.459 15.421 0.902 14.841 16.023 
AUDLAG 51.785 54.000 7.366 48.000 57.000 
Panel B: Independent Test Variables 
Variable Mean Median SD Quartile 1 Quartile 3 
BODERMX 3.379 3.000 1.902 2.000 4.000 
BODERMX_1 3.251 3.000 1.652 2.000 4.000 
SENT 2.201 2.197 0.546 1.946 2.565 
WORD 5.629 5.690 0.569 5.298 6.008 
SCOPE 0.282 0.250 0.159 0.167 0.333 
Panel C: Control Variables: Firm Controls 
Variable Mean Median SD Quartile 1 Quartile 3 
Total Assets ($b) 41.149 12.846 126.866 6.095 31.543 
SIZE 9.588 9.461 1.246 8.714 10.359 
LEVERAGE 0.597 0.595 0.211 0.462 0.725 
GROWTH 0.064 0.044 0.316 -0.025 0.119 
LOSS 0.130 0.000 0.331 0.000 0.000 
SPITEMS -0.008 -0.002 0.029 -0.009 0.000 
SEGMENTS 6.960 6.000 4.016 4.000 9.000 





LITIG 0.220 0.000 0.414 0.000 0.000 
RESTRUCTURE 0.490 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
MERGER 0.330 0.000 0.469 0.000 1.000 
DEISSUE 0.570 1.000 0.496 0.000 1.000 
ROA 0.065 0.056 0.063 0.027 0.096 
Panel D: Control Variables: Governance Characteristics 
Variable Mean Median SD Quartile 1 Quartile 3 
CEODUAL 0.560 1.000 0.497 0.00 1.00 
BOARDSIZE 10.800 11.000 2.256 9.00 12.00 
BOARDINDEP 0.767 0.818 0.154 0.692 0.889 
Board Meetings (count) 8.160 7.000 3.585 6.000 10.000 
BOARDMEET 2.025 1.946 0.373 1.792 2.303 
BLOCK 0.197 0.181 0.128 0.110 0.273 
PINST 0.840 1.000 0.371 1.000 1.000 
Panel E: Control variables: Audit-Related Characteristics 
NAS ($) 2,256,729 1.000.000 4,016,672 380,025 2,388,950 
NAS 13.610 13.816 1.909 12.848 14.686 
BUSY 0.794 1.000 0.404 1.000 1.000 





U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for companies classified as accelerated 
filers18. 
 Summary statistics for the primary and alternate test variables appear in Panel B 
of Table 3.  The primary test variable indicating the board’s level of engagement in the 
firm’s ERM (BODERMX) is an average score (median) of 3.379 (3.000) out of a 
maximum of 12 possible points19.  This indicates that the average firm in the sample 
disclosed over three board-involved ERM practices (approximately 28%).  An alternate 
measure, BODERMX_1, replaces the continuous variable reporting frequency for ERM 
updates to the board or a committee of the board (REPT_FREQ) with an ordinal variable 
with three levels.  See Panel B of Table 2 for further details. 
 Alternate measures for the test variable in Panel B of Table 3 also include the 
count of sentences and words in the risk oversight disclosure.  The average (median) 
length of disclosure is 10.316 (9.000) sentences and 321.360 (296.000) words, 
respectively.  The natural logarithm of the length of disclosure for the sample is an 
average (median) of 2.201 (2.197) sentences (SENT) and 5.629 (5.690) words (WORD), 
respectively.  Additionally, the board-level ERM engagement scope index (SCOPE) is 
included as an alternate test variable.  SCOPE is calculated as the BODERMX sum 
divided by the total possible BODERMX sum of 12.  The average (median) value for 
SCOPE is 0.282 (0.250). 
 Summary statistics for the firm-level control variables are displayed in Panel C of 
Table 3.  The total assets of the firms sampled are an average (median) of $41.149 
                                                          
18 The sample was composed of accelerated filers, with the exception of two companies that were non-
accelerated filers.  There were no small filers. Exclusion of these two non-accelerated filers does not affect 
the audit fee and audit lag results. 
19 The BODERMX is comprised of seven dichotomous variables (0/1) and one continuous variable 





($12.846) billion.  Leverage (LEVERAGE) of the sampled firms is an average (median) 
ratio of 0.597 (0.595). The leverage ratio of approximately 60.0%, indicates that the firms 
on average use debt, but are not highly leveraged.  The annual growth (GROWTH) 
variable shows an average (median) of 6.4% (4.4%).  The loss (LOSS) variable indicates 
that an average (median) of 13.0% (0.0%) of the firms experienced an operating loss in 
either the current or the previous fiscal year.  Special items scaled by total assets 
(SPITEMS) averages (median) -0.8% (-0.2%).  The number of segments reported by 
companies (SEGMENTS) in the sample is an average (median) of 6.96 (6.000).  Foreign 
currency exchange activity (FOROPS) is reported an average (median) of 38.0% (0.0%) 
for the sample.  Companies operated in litigious industries (LITIG) an average (median) 
of 22.0% (0.0%) for the sample.  Companies report the presence of restructuring 
(RESTRUCTURE) and merger/acquisition (MERGER) activities on average of 49.0% 
(0.0%) and 33.0% (0.0%), respectively.  A change of at least 10% in either debt or 
equity20 (DEISSUE) is reported an average (median) of 57.0% (100.0%) for the sample 
companies.  The return on assets ratio (ROA) is an average (median) of 0.065 (0.056) for 
the sample. 
 Governance control variables are reported in Panel D of Table 3.  The combined 
role of chief executive officer and the chairman of the board (CEODUAL) occurs in 
approximately 56.0% of the sample21.  The average (median) number of board members 
(BOARDSIZE) for companies is 10.800 (11.000).  The percentage of board members that 
are considered independent (BOARDINDEP) is an average (median) of 76.7% (81.8%).  
The average (median) number of board meetings held annually by the companies was 
                                                          
20 A change in the total amount of debt or equity dollar amount was used to compute this variable. 
21 Duality appears to have decreased on average over the last 10 years, with Naiker, Sharma, and Sharma 





8.160 (7.000). The cumulative percentage of shares held by block holders with at least 
5.0% of the outstanding shares (BLOCK) was an average (median) of 19.7% (18.1%), 
while an average (median) of 84.0% (100.0%) of the companies in the sample reported a 
majority of their shares owned by an institutional investor (PINST). 
 Audit-related control variables are reported in Panel E of Table 3.  Companies in 
the sample expended an average (median) of $2,256,729 ($1,000,000) on non-audit 
related services with the external auditors annually.  Firms whose fiscal year ends in 
either December or January (BUSY) represent 79.4% of the sample. Note that all firms in 
the sample were audited by a Big 4 auditor after the few observations utilizing a non-Big 
4 auditor were removed.  Table 4 reports the Pearson correlations matrix for the variables 
used in the regression model for Hypothesis 1.22  There are a number of significant 
correlations, but none large enough to present multicollinearity issues as all correlations 
are below the 0.80 limit (Kennedy, 2008).  Additionally, variance inflation factors (VIF) 
were utilized to assess multicollinearity, and results ranged from 1.066 to 4.41923.  This 
range is well below the recommended maximum VIF threshold of 10 (Kennedy, 2008), 
indicating multicollinearity is not an issue.  The Durbin-Watson statistic was used to 
assess the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals.  Values in the three main models 
presented in this section range between 1.831 and 2.016, which approximates the 
recommended value of 2.000 provided by Fields (2009), as well as the table for the 
maximum number of independent variables and sample size provided in Durbin and 
Watson (1950).  Finally, 
                                                          
22 A Spearman correlation matrix was compared to, and produced similar results to the Pearson correlation 
matrix.  







Table 4 – Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
VE (1)                         
TQ (2) -.065                        
AUDFEE (3) .076 -.326                       
BODERMX (4) -.024 -.168 .124                      
SIZE (5) .063 -.487 .745 .211                     
LEVERAGE (6) .027 -.349 .269 .172 .298                    
GROWTH (7) .046 .106 -.001 -.031 .021 -.071                   
LOSS (8) .270 -.173 .029 -.026 .006 .087 -.017                  
SPITEMS (9) -.093 .023 -.044 .004 .072 -.076 .039 -.276                 
SEGMENTS (10) .047 -.132 .428 .043 .202 -.056 .001 -.010 -.010                
FOROPS (11) .017 .140 .138 -.142 -.098 -.144 .021 .023 -.061 .264               
LITIG (12) .013 .283 -.107 -.099 -.120 -.219 .031 -.011 -.049 -.114 .012              
RESTRUCT (13) .043 -.081 .260 -.057 -.009 .093 -.060 .119 -.155 .163 .169 -.009             
MERGER (14) -.025 -.029 .133 .017 .035 -.047 .070 -.068 -.062 .069 .060 .026 .161            
DEISSUE (15) .030 .128 -.036 -.043 -.079 -.118 .057 -.013 .027 .029 .093 .061 .010 .088           
ROA (16) -.120 .657 -.174 -.073 -.284 -.256 .124 -.432 .407 -.014 .096 .209 -.083 -.039 .103          
CEODUAL (17) -.022 -.054 .107 .025 .133 .108 -.039 -.070 .031 .051 -.088 -.036 -.082 -.039 -.030 -.008         
BSIZE (18) .049 -.236 .361 .229 .394 .187 -.027 -.055 -.020 .085 .003 -.104 .101 .075 -.067 -.124 .005        
BINDEP (19) .010 -.083 .210 .100 .146 .066 -.068 .046 .024 .101 .002 -.036 .085 .032 -.004 -.053 .119 .033       
BMEET (20) .068 -.228 .280 .126 .280 .153 .015 .113 -.077 .051 -.074 -.049 .116 .152 .008 -.203 -.045 .142 .097      
BLOCK (21) .036 .050 -.232 -.046 -.276 .040 .069 .128 -.044 -.093 .032 -.028 .029 -.032 .004 -.058 -.081 -.150 -.051 .069     
PINST (22) -.023 -.007 .168 .127 .166 .021 .006 -.080 -.010 .091 .006 -.044 .018 .022 -.015 .058 .029 .129 .115 .002 -.207    
NAS (23) .027 -.161 .585 .067 .424 .151 -.014 -.058 -.042 .253 .100 -.050 .219 .123 -.004 -.061 .101 .248 .094 .155 -.163 .127   
BUSY (24) .006 -.130 .057 .020 .150 .145 -.009 .054 .022 -.020 -.017 -.092 -.072 -.031 -.028 -.160 .133 .023 -.039 .124 .107 .016 .022  





homoscedasticity was tested for using HC3 and HC4 estimators24.  No significant 
homoscedasticity was detected at the model level or at the independent variable and 
BODERMX relationship for any of the three models. 
Multivariate Analysis of Main Model Hypothesis 1 – Volatility of Earnings (VE) 
 Coefficients for the industry and year dummy variables were included in the 
regression models, but not reported in order to conserve space.  The main regression 
models for VE and TQ are statistically significant with explanatory power (adjusted R2) 
0.016 and 0.583, respectively.  
Table 5 represents the results of the regression of VE on the test and control 
variables related to Hypothesis 1, which predicted a negative association between 
variance of earnings and board-level ERM engagement.  Results were reported using 
both the BODERMX and BODERMX_1 test variables.  The results on both measures 
(BODERMX, p = 0.027; BODERMX_1, p = 0.040) indicate a significant negative 
relationship with VE25. Together, these results suggest VE is negatively associated with 
disclosure of board-level ERM engagement. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. These 
results are similar to those reported by Edmonds, Edmonds, Leece and Vermeer (2015) 
using the risk management quality index (β = -0.013; p < .001), which is an index based  
                                                          
24 HCSE estimators are derived from an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix (Hayes & Cai, 2007).  
The estimates are created with the assumption that homoscedasticity does not exist, which is an assumption 
utilized in OLS regression.  The OLS regression is then compared to the HC3 and HC4 estimates to see if a 
difference exists.  
25 The largest 35 firm-year observations measured by SIZE, represent approximately seven companies 
contained six financial organizations and one conglomerate organization with a large financial services 
arm.   Sensitivity analysis was performed using a sub-sample excluding these companies.  The results were 
similar to the main model results with similar results for the TQ and AUDFEE models.  The VE results 
were not significant.  The VE for this sub-sample of 35 firm-year observations is actually higher with a 
mean (median) of 33.391 (3.125).  The BODERMX for this subsample is a mean (median) of 5.171 
(5.000), which is higher than the mean and median results for the full sample.  This higher level of 
BODERMX disclosed by larger and more highly-regulated companies appears to be affecting the main 
model results for VE.  Industry adjustment analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but may be 





Table 5 – Regression Results of Test of Hypothesis 1:  Variance of Earnings and Board-
Level ERM Engagement Index 
    BODERMX  BODERMX_1 
Variable  
Expected 
Sign  Estimate  t-value  p-value 
 
Estimate  t-value  p-value 
Intercept  ?  -47.660  -2.857  0.004  -47.639  -2.856  0.004 
BODERMX  -  -0.789  -1.935  0.027**      
BODERMX_1  -       -0.824  -1.753  0.040** 
SIZE  -  -0.036  -0.33  0.487  -0.026  -0.024  0.491 
LEVERAGE  ?  1.149  0.289  0.773  1.113  0.280  0.780 
GROWTH  ?  6.554  2.834  0.005***  6.570  2.841  0.005*** 
SEGMENTS  +  0.177  0.819  0.207  0.174  0.806  0.210 
FOROPS  +  0.661  0.398  0.345  0.697  0.420  0.337 
RESTRUCTURE  +  2.930  1.747  0.041**  2.967  1.769  0.039** 
MERGER  +  -2.170  -1.324  0.186  -2.157  -1.316  0.188 
CEODUAL  +  -1.394  -0.909  0.363  -1.360  -0.887  0.375 
BOARDSIZE  -  0.524  1.426  0.154  0.509  1.388  0.165 
BOARDINDEP  -  0.199  0.034  0.973  0.206  0.035  0.972 
BOARDMEET  -  4.100  1.950  0.051*  4.080  1.940  0.053* 
PINST  -  -2.033  -1.009  0.157  -2.100  -1.043  0.149 
AUDFEE  ?  2.756  1.662  0.097*  2.766     1.668  0.096* 
NAS  ?  -0.335  -0.711  0.477  -0.336  -0.714  0.475 
Industries    Included     Included    
Years    Included     Included    
Observations    2,264     2,264    
Adjusted R2    0.016     0.016    
F-value    2.313***     2.289***    
Durbin-Watson    2.016     2.016    
             




    
 
    
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
 
on COSO guidance “for measuring the board’s responsibilities and oversight areas that 
contribute to risk management quality” (Edmonds et al., 2015). 
Results on the control variables for both models in Table 5 show that GROWTH 
is positively and highly significantly related to VE (p < 0.01), while RESTRUCTURE is 
positively and significantly related to VE (p < 0.05).  BOARDMEET and AUDFEE are 
positively and marginally significantly related to VE (p < 0.10).  BOARDMEET was 





All other control variables in the equation do not have significant relationships with VE.  
The explanatory power (adjusted R2) of both the BODERMX and the BODERMX_1 
models is 0.016, which is low26. 
The significant negative association between VE and BODERMX might be used 
in several different contexts.  A company might see the low level of variation as a sign of 
a soundly operating ERM system, whereas some investors might actually prefer a higher 
level of volatility in order to capture short-term gains.  A regulator could also view the 
lack of volatility as a possible sign of earnings management.  These different views 
indicate that various users of ERM information may have different definitions of value in 
ERM. 
Multivariate Analysis of Main Model Hypothesis 2 – Firm Valuation (TQ) 
Table 6 represents the results of the regression of TQ on the test and control 
variables related to Hypothesis 2, which predicted a positive relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and board-level ERM engagement.  Results are reported using both the 
BODERMX and the BODERMX_1 test variables.  The results indicate a significant 
negative relationship between BODERMX and TQ (p = 0.016) and between 
BODERMX_1 and TQ (p = 0.013).  Therefore, based on the inverse relationship between 
TQ and BODERMX, Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  
 Results from the control variables show that GROWTH, ROA, FOROPS, and 
AUDFEE are positively and highly significantly related to TQ (p < 0.01), while SIZE, 
LEVERAGE, SEGMENTS, and RESTRUCTURE are negatively and highly significantly  
                                                          
26 Alternate calculations for VE and different VE models were tested, but all yielded similar adjusted R2 
results.  The Edmonds et al. (2015) study had adjusted R2
 






Table 6 – Regression Results of Test of Hypothesis 2: Tobin’s Q and the Board-Level 
ERM Engagement Index 





Sign  Estimate  t-value  p-value 
 





2.972  7.456  0.000 
 
2.971  7.454  0.000 
BODERMX  +  -0.023  -2.409  0.016**       
BODERMX_1  +        -0.028  -2.478  0.013** 
SIZE  -  -0.346  -13.322  0.000***  -0.345  -13.280  0.000*** 
LEVERAGE  ?  -0.620  -6.495  0.000***  -0.619  -6.483  0.000*** 
GROWTH  ?  0.152  2.743  0.006***  0.152  2.744  0.006*** 
ROA  +  9.514  30.772  0.000***  9.515  30.776  0.000*** 
SEGMENTS  +  -0.032  -6.194  0.000***  -0.032  -6.226  0.000*** 
FOROPS  +  0.101  2.561  0.001***  0.101  2.572  0.005*** 
RESTRUCTURE  +  -0.183  -4.539  0.000***  -0.182  -4.525  0.000*** 
MERGER  +  -0.086  -2.208  0.027**  -0.086  -2.191  0.029** 
CEODUAL  +  0.053  1.464  0.072*  0.055  1.494  0.068* 
BOARDSIZE  -  -0.011  -1.283  0.100  -0.011  -1.289  0.099* 
BOARDINDEP  -  -0.283  -2.034  0.021**  -0.279  -2.005  0.023** 
BOARDMEET  -  -0.013  -0.263  0.396  -0.013  -0.253  0.400 
PINST  -  0.083  1.731  0.084*  0.082  1.716  0.086* 
AUDFEE  ?  0.176  4.459  0.000***  0.176  4.462  0.000*** 
NAS  ?  -0.003  -0.266  0.790  -0.003  -0.272  0.786 
Industries    Included      Included     
Years    Included      Included     
Observations    2,264      2,264     
Adjusted R2        0.583      0.583 
F-value    110.061***      110.089***     
Durbin-Watson    1.831      1.832     
              
              
              
              
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
 
 
related to TQ (p < 0.01).  MERGER and BOARDINDEP are negatively significantly 
related to TQ (p < 0.05).  CEODUAL and PINST are positively and marginally 
significantly related to TQ (p < 0.10), while BOARDSIZE is negatively and marginally 
significantly related to TQ (p < 0.10) when the BODERMX_1 model is utilized.  
SEGMENTS, RESTRUCTURE, and MERGER were predicted to have a positive 
directional sign, but all three display a negative sign. PINST was predicted to have a 





variables have the expected signs.  Results are similar for the BODERMX_1 model.  The 
explanatory power (adjusted R2) of both versions of the main model is 0.583. 
 The surprising results of the relationship between TQ and BODERMX appear to 
indicate that investors may not value board engagement in risk oversight at the firm level.  
The difference in results from the previous literature may be due to the size and stability 
of the organizations in this sample.  The investors may simply not see these particular 
organizations as needing additional risk management efforts.  However, under Additional 
Analysis, I examine why investors may not be valuing board-level engagement in risk 
oversight by delineating board-level ERM practices into ERM strategy and governance. 
Multivariate Analysis of Main Model Hypothesis 3 – Audit Fee (AUDFEE) 
Table 7 represents the results of the regression of audit fees on the test and control 
variables related to Hypothesis 3, which did not predict a directional relationship between 
audit fees paid by a client to their auditor and board-level ERM engagement.  Results are 
reported using both the BODERMX and BODERMX_1 test variables.  The results do not 
indicate a significant relationship between BODERMX and AUDFEE (p=0.353) or 
between BODERMX_1 and AUDFEE (p = 0.371).  As there are no prior studies 
examining these relationships, comparable results are not available. 
 Results from the control variables show that SIZE, LEVERAGE, SEGMENTS, 
FOROPS, RESTRUCTURE, BOARDSIZE, BOARDINDEP, BOARDMEET and NAS 
are positively and highly significantly related to AUDFEE (p < 0.01).  MERGER is 
positively and significantly related to AUDFEE (p < 0.05). SPITEMS and BLOCK are 
negatively significantly related to AUDFEE (p < 0.05).  LOSS is positively and 








Table 7 – Regression Results of Test of Hypothesis 3: AUDFEE and the Board-Level 
ERM Engagement Index 





Sign Estimate  t-value  p-value 
 
Estimate  t-value  p-value 
Intercept ? 8.933  83.500  0.000 
 
8.934  83.519  0.000 
BODERMX ? -0.005  -0.929  0.353       
BODERMX_1 ?       -0.005  -0.895  0.371 
SIZE + 0.447  43.196  0.000***  0.447  43.142  0.000*** 
LEVERAGE + 0.322  6.287  0.000***  0.322  6.286  0.000*** 
GROWTH + 0.002  0.061  0.478  0.002  0.063  0.475 
LOSS + 0.048  1.592  0.056*  0.048  1.594  0.056* 
SPITEMS + -0.085  -2.544  0.011**  -0.852  -2.550  0.011** 
SEGMENTS + 0.034  12.904  0.000***  0.034  12.881  0.000*** 
FOROPS + 0.167  8.013  0.000***  0.167  8.025  0.000*** 
LITIG + -0.002  -0.077  0.938  -0.003  -0.079  0.937 
RESTRUCTURE + 0.153  7.191  0.000***  0.153  7.200  0.000*** 
MERGER + 0.044  2.095  0.018**  0.044  2.100  0.018** 
DEISSUE + -0.002  -0.112  0.911  -0.002  -0.117  0.907 
CEODUAL - -0.009  -0.443  0.329  -0.008  -0.429  0.334 
BOARDSIZE ? 0.016  3.383  0.001***  0.016  3.375  0.001*** 
BOARDINDEP ? 0.442  5.943  0.000***  0.443  5.944  0.000*** 
BOARDMEET ? 0.103  3.785  0.000***  0.103  3.785  0.000*** 
BLOCK ? -0.176  -2.222  0.026**  -0.176  -2.200  0.027** 
PINST - -0.001  -0.037  0.486  -0.001  -0.047  0.481 
NAS + 0.090  15.789  0.000***  0.090  15.788  0.000*** 
BUSY + -0.004  -0.161  0.872  -0.004  -0.178  0.858 
Industries  Included      Included     
Years  Included      Included     
Observations  2,264      2,264     
Adjusted R2      0.771      0.771 
F-value  232.516***      232.508***     
Durbin-Watson  1.944      1.944     
            
            
            
            
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 




a positive sign, but instead, they have a negative sign. All other significant control 





BODERMX_1 model.  All other control variables are not significantly related to 
AUDFEE.  The explanatory power (adjusted R2) of the both versions of the main model 
is 0.771. 
 The results between AUDFEE and BODERMX may indicate that auditors do not 
link additional board-level ERM efforts with misstatement risk of financial statements. 
An alternate explanation could be that auditors utilize the information, but see additional 
board-level ERM effort as a signal that the firm is or will be assuming higher risk 





V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
Companies listed on the S&P 500 for All Five Years 2010-2014 
 One criticism of the use of the companies in the S&P 500 for this study might be 
that they are more mature and stable, and have better resources to put programs such as 
ERM in place.  Given that companies enter and exit the S&P 500 index annually based 
on listing requirements27, I re-performed the analyses for companies only listed in the 
S&P 500 for the entire five-year period (2010-2014), as well as an alternate regression 
consisting of companies not in the S&P 500 for all five years of the sample.  Table 8 
represents the results of the regressions of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on BODERMX for the 
sub-sample representing companies in the S&P 500 all five years (N=1,858), while Table 
9 represents the results of companies not in the S&P 500 for all five years (N=406).  The 
firms that were in the S&P 500 for all five years would generally be expected to be more 
stable, and therefore have more mature ERM processes, and produce a lower variance of 
earnings.  
 The results of the regression of VE on BODERMX for the sample that was in the 
S&P 500 for all five years were consistent with the main sample results, but the level of 
significance between VE and BODERMX (p = 0.007) improved along with an increase in 
the adjusted R2 value from 0.016 to 0.026.  This increase in strength is likely an effect
                                                          
27 1,858 companies of the total sample were listed on the S&P 500 for all five years 2010-2014.  This 





Table 8 – Regression of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on the Board-Level ERM Engagement 
Index for Companies Continuously Listed on the S&P 500 Index in All Years from 2010 
to 2014 






e p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept ? -26.760 0.126 1.898 0.000 8.528 0.000 
BODERMX -/+/? -1.060 0.007*** -0.030 0.001*** -0.003 0.592 
SIZE -/-/+ -0.067 0.477 -0.317 0.000*** 0.441 0.000*** 
LEVERAGE ?/?/+ 0.930 0.824 -0.371 0.000*** 0.368 0.000*** 
GROWTH ?/?/+ 6.825 0.003*** 0.060 0.215 0.014 0.471 
ROA NR/+/NR - - 10.384 0.000*** - - 
LOSS NR/NR/+ - - - - 0.014 0.406 
SPITEMS NR/NR/+ - - - - -1.446 0.002*** 
SEGMENTS +/+/+ 0.204 0.179 -0.032 0.000*** 0.035 0.000*** 
FOROPS +/+/+ 2.191 0.110 0.118 0.001*** 0.192 0.000*** 
LITIG NR/NR/+ - - - - 0.038 0.143 
RESTRUCTUR
E +/+/+ 3.122 0.040** -0.116 0.002*** 0.128 0.000*** 
MERGER +/+/+ -2.332 0.181 -0.042 0.123 0.042 0.035** 
DEISSUE NR/NR/+ - - - - -0.014 0.510 
CEODUAL +/+/- 0.003 0.500 0.044 0.100 -0.015 0.252 
BOARDSIZE -/-/? 1.251 0.001*** -0.011 0.096* 0.013 0.013** 
BOARDINDEP -/-/? -1.113 0.431 -0.027 0.420 0.440 0.000*** 
BOARDMEET -/-/? 5.204 0.023** -0.085 0.038** 0.120 0.000*** 
BLOCK NR/NR/? - - - - -0.133 0.145 
PINST -/-/- -3.639 0.055** -0.004 0.465 0.029 0.340 
AUDFEE ?/?/NR 1.846 0.296 0.200 0.000*** - - 
NAS ?/?/+ -0.775 0.176 -0.004 0.731 0.113 0.000*** 




d  Included 




d  Included 
 Included  
Observations  1,858  1,858  1,858  









*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  Variables marked with a directional sign of NR are not reported as those variables 








Table 9 – Regression of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on the Board-Level ERM Engagement 
Index for Companies Not Continuously Listed on the S&P 500 Index 2010 to 2014 










112.860 0.027 7.863 0.000 9.387 0.000 
BODERMX -/+/? -0.216 0.429 0.019 0.283 -0.016 0.198 
SIZE -/-/+ 1.937 0.557 -0.343 0.000*** 0.485 0.000*** 
LEVERAGE ?/?/+ 2.509 0.845 -2.158 0.000*** 0.145 0.145 
GROWTH ?/?/+ 12.049 0.206 1.112 0.000*** -0.255 0.010** 
ROA NR/+/NR - - 5.856 0.000*** - - 
LOSS NR/NR/+ - - - - 0.156 0.007*** 
SPITEMS NR/NR/+ - - - - 0.196 0.333 
SEGMENTS +/+/+ 0.256 0.371 -0.044 0.046** 0.023 0.003*** 
FOROPS +/+/+ -2.454 0.590 -0.011 0.393 -0.001 0.978 
LITIG NR/NR/+ - - - - -0.174 0.012** 
RESTRUCTUR
E +/+/+ 0.682 0.445 -0.197 0.154 0.151 0.002*** 
MERGER +/+/+ -0.062 0.989 -0.212 0.101 0.042 0.190 
DEISSUE NR/NR/+ - - - - 0.015 0.369 
CEODUAL +/+/- -7.163 0.085* -0.022 0.853 0.008 0.857 
BOARDSIZE -/-/? -3.321 0.002*** -0.001 0.961 0.033 0.004*** 
BOARDINDEP -/-/? -4.125 0.392 -1.235 0.002*** 0.315 0.048** 
BOARDMEET -/-/? 2.179 0.690 0.144 0.357 0.064 0.269 
BLOCK NR/NR/? - - - - -0.292 0.063* 
PINST -/-/- 3.924 0.398 0.513 0.000*** -0.055 0.128 
AUDFEE ?/?/NR 7.970 0.106 -0.069 0.620 - - 
NAS ?/?/+ 0.177 0.854 0.013 0.631 0.052 0.000*** 




d  Included 




d  Included 
 Included  
Observations  406  406  406  
Adjusted R2   0.032  0.589  0.788 
F-value  1.475*  24.846**
* 
 46.581***  
 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions.  Variables marked with a directional sign of NR are not reported as those variables 






from the companies who entered or exited the S&P 500 Index having a greater volatility 
of earnings and disclosing fewer board-level ERM oversight practices28. 
 The results of the regression of TQ on BODERMX indicate highly significant 
negative results (p = 0.001), in contrast to the main sample results, which were 
significant, but not as strong (p = 0.016).  The negative direction may indicate that 
investors value a firm to a lesser degree as the disclosure of board-level ERM 
engagement increases, or as the maturity of the firm increases. The explanatory value of 
the regression increased from 0.0583 to 0.630. 
 The results of the regression of AUDFEE on BODERMX were not significant for 
the sample of firms in the S&P 500 for all five years, consistent with the main AUDFEE 
results. A similar series of regressions were run for companies not listed in the S&P 500 
index for all five years and are displayed in Table 9.  The results for BODERMX 
regressed on VE, TQ, and AUDFEE were not significant.   
 
Alternate Measures for Board-Level ERM Engagement Index 
 Consistent with Edmunds et al. (2015), I constructed alternate indices based on 
the count of words and sentences for the board-level risk disclosures in the proxies 
sampled.  The variable of interest was replaced with these alternate variables to 
understand if a relationship exists between the three dependent variables and complexity 
of the board-level ERM engagement disclosure for the full sample of companies. The 
results of the regression of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on WORD are reported in Panel A of 
Table 10.  The regression of VE on WORD has a mildly significant negative (p = 0.054)  
                                                          
28 Companies listed on the S&P 500 index for all five years of the sample have a mean BODERMX count 
of 3.418 and a mean variance of earnings value of 5.231, while companies not listed for all five years have 





Table 10 – Regression of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on Count of Words, Sentences, and BODERMX Scope 
Panel A: Regression of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on the Count of Words 
  VE TQ AUDFEE 
Variable 
Expected Sign 
(VE/TQ/AUDFEE) Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
WORD -/+/? -2.114 0.054* -0.065 0.036** 0.004 0.788 
Control Variables 
 Included  Included  Included  
Industries  Included  Included  Included  
Years  Included  Included  Included  
Observations  2,264  2,264  2,264  
Adjusted R2   0.015  0.583  0.771 
F-value  2.271***  109.942***  232.41***  
Panel B: Regression of VE, TW, and AUDFEE on the Count of Sentences 
  VE TQ AUDFEE 
Variable 
Expected Sign 
(VE/TQ/AUDFEE) Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
SENT -/+/? -2.2282 0.047** -0.045 0.161 -0.005 0.774 
Control Variables 
 Included  Included  Included  
Industries  Included  Included  Included  
Years  Included  Included  Included  
Observations  2,264  2,264  2,264  
Adjusted R2   0.016  0.582  0.771 
F-value  2.279***  109.741***  232.411***  
 
Panel C: Regression of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on the BODERMX Scope 
  VE TQ AUDFEE 
Variable 
Expected Sign 
(VE/TQ/AUDFEE) Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
SCOPE -/+/? -9.469 0.265 -0.280 0.016** -0.058 0.353 
Control Variables  Included  Included  Included  
Industries  Included  Included  Included  
Years  Included  Included  Included  
Observations  2,264  2,264  2,264  
Adjusted R2   0.016  0.583  0.771 
F-value  2.313***  110.610***  232.516***  
 
 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 






relationship.  The association between VE and WORD indicates that the complexity of 
disclosure is related to the variance of earnings. This may indicate that companies 
practicing more complex board-level ERM efforts produce a lower variance of earnings. 
 TQ and WORD have a significant negative (p = 0.036) relationship, consistent 
with the main BODERMX model.  This result again shows a relationship between the 
complexity of board-level ERM disclosure and investors’ valuation of those efforts.  
AUDFEE and WORD do not have a significant association.  
 The regressions of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on SENT are reported in Panel B of 
Table 10.  The relationship between VE and SENT is negative and significant (p = 
0.047).  The association between TQ and SENT, as well as the association between 
AUDFEE and SENT, are not significant. The results of these regressions utilizing count 
of words and sentences indicate a relationship between the complexity of board-level 
ERM effort disclosure with variance of earnings, for both words and sentences.  The 
relationship between TQ and words is negative and significant.  The other relationships 
were not significant. 
 The regressions of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on the BODERMX scope calculation 
(SCOPE) is reported in Panel C of Table 10.  The relationship between VE and SCOPE 
was not significant, nor was the relationship between AUDFEE and SCOPE.  The 








The Effect of the Group of Individual Variables Comprising the Board-Level ERM 
Engagement Index 
 The main analyses in this paper utilize BODERMX calculated as a single sum of 
variable values.  The contribution and significance of each included variable, when 
grouped, is reported in Table 11. The group is utilizing all of the variables individually 
that represent BODERMX.  The presence of a management-level risk committee 
(MGT_RC) (p = 0.093) is negatively and mildly significantly related to variance of 
earnings.  The reporting frequency (REPT_FREQ) (p = 0.012) is negatively and 
significantly (p < 0.05) related to variance of earnings.  These two negative relationships 
indicate the importance of management’s participation in the board-level ERM processes.  
These important processes are an area that an organization may want to examine to 
review or improve their ERM program.  The regression of TQ on the individual variables 
when grouped, has a positive and highly significant (p < 0.001) relationship with 
integration between ERM and strategy (INT_W_STRAT).  The presence of MGT_RC 
and the phrase “ERM” being used in the proxy (PHRASE_ERM_USED) have a negative 
and highly significant association (p < 0.001) with TQ.  Participation of the board in the 
risk appetite setting process (RISK_APP) has a negative and significant (p = 0.019) 
relationship with TQ.  REPT_FREQ has a negative and mildly significant relationship (p 
= 0.063) association with TQ.  Additionally, the CRO variable did not have significance 
in this model.  That is important as previous literature has used the presence of a CRO as 
an indicator of ERM.  Taken as a whole these results suggest that investors value ERM 
when it supports corporate strategy but not when the focus of ERM is governance 






Table 11 – Regression of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on the Individual Variables When 
Grouped Comprising the Board-Level ERM Engagement Index 
 VE TQ AUDFEE 
Variable Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
INT_W_STRAT -0.020 0.500 0.150 0.000*** 0.066 0.001*** 
BOARD_OVERSIGHT 0.905 0.864 -0.049 0.347 -0.185 0.003*** 
MGT_RC -2.610 0.093* -0.135 0.002*** -0.024 0.475 
REPT_FREQ -1.680 0.012** -0.027 0.063* -0.007 0.236 
CRO 2.228 0.346 0.086 0.124 0.028 0.258 
RISK_APP 1.180 0.642 -0.125 0.019** -0.070 0.015** 
COMM_PRIMARY 0.667 0.679 -0.006 0.442 -0.008 0.350 
PHRASE_ERM_USED -1.075 0.252 -0.092 0.008*** -0.015 0.227 
Control Variables Included  Included  Included  
Industries Included  Included  Included  
Years Included  Included  Included  
Observations 2,264  2,264  2,264  
Adjusted R2  0.015  0.588  0.773 
F-value 1.991***  90.382***  193.718***  
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
See the Appendix for variable definitions.  The control variables are identical to the set utilized in the main models. 
 
creating firm value that is supported by a resource dependence view.  The latter suggests 
investors do not prefer when board level ERM efforts are targeted at 
monitoring/governance because this may mean valuable directorial level resources are 
utilized for oversight of management that does not create firm value. Hence, the latter 
seems less consistent with the agency view that investors value the governance aspect of 
board level ERM. 
 The regression of AUDFEE on the individual variables when grouped has a 
positive and highly significant relationship with INT_W_STRAT (p = 0.001) and a 
negative and highly significant relationship with board oversight of ERM 





RISK_APP is negative and significant (p = 0.015).  The findings related to AUDFEE 
seem to indicate that auditors see involvement in setting the risk appetite of the firm as a 
benefit of agency governance, thereby lowering their fees, whereas ERM focusing on 
strategy may not be seen as a risk reducer, therefore allowing the auditor to charge a 
higher fee.  An explanation for this relationship may be that the auditor assumes the client 
is taking a higher level of risk. 
The Effect of Individual Variables Comprising the Board-Level ERM Engagement Index 
While the previous analysis utilized the group of individual variables comprising 
BODERMX, this analysis utilizes each individual variable as a replacement for 
BODERMX in its own regression.  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 12. 
The regression of VE on the individual variables has a significant (p = 0.011) and 
negative relationship with REPT_FREQ, while MGT_RC has a mildly significant (p = 
0.060) negative relationship with VE.  The regression of TQ on the individual variables 
has a positive and highly significant (p < 0.001) relationship with INT_W_STRAT.  TQ 
has a negative and highly significant relationship with MGT_RC and 
PHRASE_ERM_USED (p < 0.01).  REPT_FREQ, RISK_APP, and a committee being 
appointed with primary responsibility for oversight of ERM activities at the committee 
level (COMM_PRIMARY) have a negative significant (p < .05) association with TQ.  
The sum of the findings related to TQ appears to reveal a viewpoint opposite that of 
auditors.  Investors appear to embrace ERM when it is value adding, consistent with 
resource dependence theory, but do not like ERM control costs, consistent with an 







Table 12 – Regression of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on the Individual Variables Comprising 
the Board-Level ERM Engagement Index 
 VE TQ AUDFEE 
Variable Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
INT_W_STRAT   0.114 0.001*** 0.048 0.012** 
BOARD_OVERSIGHT     -0.163 0.007*** 
MGT_RC -2.935 0.060* -0.178 0.000*** -0.037 0.063* 
REPT_FREQ -1.660 0.011** -0.030 0.042**   
CRO       
RISK_APP   -0.104 0.035** -0.050 0.054* 
COMM_PRIMARY   -0.063 0.040**   
PHRASE_ERM_USED   -0.104 0.002***   
Control Variables Included  Included  Included  
Industries Included  Included  Included  
Years Included  Included  Included  
Observations 2,264  2,264  2,264  
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
See the Appendix for variable definitions.   
The variables displayed in this table replaced BODERMX as the variable of interest on an individual basis.  A separate regression was 
run for each variable.  Results are reported only when significant between the dependent variable and the variable of interest.  The 
control variables are identical to the set utilized in the main regression models. 
 
The regression of AUDFEE on the individual variables comprising BODERMX 
has a significant (p = 0.012) positive association with INT_W_STRAT, while AUDFEE 
and BOARD_OVERSIGHT have a highly significant negative relationship (p = 0.007) 
relationship.  MGT_RC and RISK_APP have a negative and mildly significant (p < 0.10) 
association with AUDFEE.  These individual results appear to reinforce the group 
regression results, and could further indicate that auditors may see the integration of 
ERM with strategy as the entity assuming higher levels of risk in pursuit of strategy, and 
charge a higher fee to incorporate that potential effect, while viewing the governing 





While each of these individual regression results has been interpreted 
individually, they show a mixture of results with regard to the original directional 
hypotheses.  These individual results each merit further exploration as possible future 
research to better understand how various stakeholders view the involvement of board 
subcommittees in the ERM process. 
The most important theme that appears to emerge from the group and individual 
analyses are how various ERM stakeholders utilize their information.  Investors appear to 
reward companies that employ ERM strategically, but not do so for ERM governance.  
Auditors, on the other hand, appear to reward clients with lower fees when they exhibit 
more ERM governance and charge higher fees when they integrate ERM with strategy. 
The Effect of Companies Other than Banking or Insurance Comprising the Board-Level 
ERM Engagement Index 
 The sample was divided into two sub-samples for this sensitivity test.  The first 
set was comprised only of companies that were not banks or insurance companies, while 
the latter consisted of only companies in those two categories29.  The main regression 
models were then employed to test these two scenarios, using BODERMX as the variable 
of interest.  The results for companies other than banking and insurance and utilizing 
BODERMX are shown in Table 13.  The relationship between BODERMX and VE is 
negatively significant (p = 0.038) for companies other than banking and insurance, 
consistent with the results of the main analysis reported earlier.  The results for bank and 
insurance only companies for the regression with VE were not significant, as shown in 
Table 14. 
                                                          
29 The N for companies other than banking and insurance is 2,103 and the companies in banking and 





Table 13 – Regression of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on the Board-Level ERM Engagement Index for 
Companies Other Than Banking and Insurance 
  VE TQ AUDFEE 
Variable 
Expected Sign 
(VE/TQ/AUDFEE) Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept ? -28.708 0.104 2.742 0.000 9.029 0.000 
BODERMX -/+/? -0.779 0.038** -0.028 0.008*** 0.003 0.590 
SIZE -/-/+ 0.145 0.900 -0.368 0.000*** 0.451 0.000*** 
LEVERAGE ?/?/+ 1.051 0.400 -0.513 0.000*** 0.388 0.000*** 
GROWTH ?/?/+ -3.306 0.365 0.287 0.001*** -0.090 0.026** 
ROA NR/+/NR - - 9.173 0.000*** - - 
LOSS NR/NR/+ - - - - 0.066 0.017** 
SPITEMS NR/NR/+ - - - - -0.714 0.033** 
SEGMENTS +/+/+ 0.127 0.282 -0.029 0.000*** 0.033 0.000*** 
FOROPS +/+/+ -0.272 0.436 0.085 0.020** 0.155 0.000*** 
LITIG NR/NR/+ - - - - 0.000 0.999 
RESTRUCTURE +/+/+ 2.462 0.079* -0.207 0.000*** 0.144 0.000*** 
MERGER +/+/+ -2.232 0.189 -0.097 0.020** 0.052 0.008*** 
DEISSUE NR/NR/+ - - - - 0.003 0.441 
CEODUAL +/+/- -1.040 0.513 0.064 0.049** 0.017 0.199 
BOARDSIZE -/-/? 0.555 0.140 -0.008 0.189 0.014 0.004*** 
BOARDINDEP -/-/? 0.008 0.999 -0.364 0.007*** 0.370 0.000*** 
BOARDMEET -/-/? 2.846 0.192 -0.042 0.217 0.077 0.006*** 
BLOCK NR/NR/? - - - - -0.289 0.000*** 
PINST -/-/- -0.804 0.349 0.096 0.058* 0.015 0.567 
AUDFEE ?/?/NR 1.891 0.274 0.185 0.000*** - - 
NAS ?/?/+ -0.374 0.428 -0.005 0.634 0.080 0.000*** 
BUSY NR/NR/? - - - - -0.017 0.487 
Industries  Included  Included  Included  
Years  Included  Included  Included  
Observations  2,103  2,103  2,103  
Adjusted R2   0.006  0.561  0.765 
F-value  1.452*  93.665***  209.643***  
 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. Variables marked with a directional sign of NR are not reported as those variables 









Table 14 – Regression of VE, TQ, and AUDFEE on the Board-Level ERM Engagement 
Index for Banking and Insurance Companies Only 
  VE TQ AUDFEE 
Variable 
Expected Sign 
(VE/TQ/AUDFEE) Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept ? -47.676 0.571 0.643 0.495 7.416 0.000 
BODERMX -/+/? -0.271 0.428 -0.008 0.618 -0.047 0.001*** 
SIZE -/-/+ 5.393 0.264 0.146 0.007*** 0.318 0.000*** 
LEVERAGE ?/?/+ -15.673 0.462 -1.607 0.000*** -0.261 0.198 
GROWTH ?/?/+ 11.197 0.001*** 0.021 0.281 0.030 0.188 
ROA NR/+/NR - - 18.355 0.000*** - - 
LOSS NR/NR/+ - - - - -0.032 0.714 
SPITEMS NR/NR/+ - - - - -1.937 0.359 
SEGMENTS +/+/+ 1.722 0.117 -0.004 0.817 0.024 0.039** 
FOROPS +/+/+ 14.241 0.058* 0.182 0.031** 0.268 0.001*** 
RESTRUCTURE +/+/+ -1.791 0.802 0.143 0.032** 0.100 0.061* 
MERGER +/+/+ 8.644 0.096 -0.046 0.517 0.021 0.366 
DEISSUE NR/NR/+ - - - - 0.030 0.298 
CEODUAL +/+/- -7.951 0.197 -0.134 0.043** -0.060 0.146 
BOARDSIZE -/-/? 1.676 0.407 0.005 0.414 0.023 0.223 
BOARDINDEP -/-/? -6.441 0.394 0.280 0.283 0.434 0.062* 
BOARDMEET -/-/? 14.629 0.114 -0.090 0.181 0.264 0.002*** 
BLOCK NR/NR/? - - - - 0.047 0.857 
PINST -/-/- -21.205 0.010** 0.057 0.552 -0.305 0.000*** 
AUDFEE ?/?/NR -0.848 0.924 -0.053 0.580 - - 
NAS ?/?/+ -1.824 0.658 -0.019 0.671 0.279 0.000*** 
BUSY NR/NR/? - - - - 0.556 0.000*** 
Years  Included  Included  Included  
Observations  161  161  161  
Adjusted R2   0.199  0.865  0.885 
F-value  3.098***  52.414***  54.352***  
 
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Table 2 for variable definitions. Variables marked with a directional sign of NR are not reported as those variables 
were not utilized in that particular regression model.  The LITIG variable is excluded from the AUDFEE model as 
banking and insurance are not in the SIC code ranges classifies as litigious operating environments. 
  
 
The relationship between the companies other than banking and insurance (Table 
13) between TQ and BODERMX are negative and highly significant (p = 0.008) 
consistent with the main analysis, while the results for banking and insurance companies 
only (Table 14) were not significant.  The relationship for companies other than banking 
and insurance (Table 13) between AUDFEE and BODERMX is not significant, 





for companies only in banking and insurance (Table 14) is negative and highly significant 
(p = 0.001).  The auditor working with banks and insurance companies may be 
appreciating more ERM governance in these highly-regulated industries and charging 
lower fees for the organizations exhibiting higher levels of ERM governance as an 
additional layer of controls. 
Alternate Dependent Variable Testing of Audit Lag and the Board-Level ERM 
Engagement Index 
 The final alternate analysis replaces the AUDFEE dependent variable with audit 
lag (AUDLAG).  The results for audit lag and BODERMX are shown in Table 15.  The 
results of the regression indicate that a highly significant (p = 0.003) positive association 
exists AUDLAG and BODERMX.  This indicates that the number of days between the 
fiscal year-end and the issuance of the audit report for the company being audited rises as 
the count of items in the BODERMX rise.  The positive association may indicate that 
companies with higher levels of ERM effort may be conveying a more complex risk 
environment that consequently takes longer to understand and therefore extends the time 
to audit.  This is an interesting finding, and may provide an avenue for future research to 






Table 15 – Regression Results of Alternate Testing of Audit Lag and the Board-Level 
ERM Engagement Index 
    BODERMX  
Variable  
Expected 
Sign  Estimate  t-value  p-value 
 
Intercept  ?  53.479  30.461  0.000  
BODERMX  ?  0.253  2.964  0.003***  
SIZE  +  -0.993  -5.853  0.000***  
LEVERAGE  +  3.039  3.613  0.000***  
GROWTH  +  -0.176  -0.362  0.717  
LOSS  +  0.800  1.606  0.108  
SPITEMS  +  8.883  1.621  0.105  
SEGMENTS  +  0.057  1.320  0.187  
FOROPS  +  0.147  0.429  0.668  
LITIG  +  0.019  0.037  0.971  
RESTRUCTURE  +  -1.028  -2.945  0.003***  
MERGER  +  1.034  3.007  0.003***  
DEISSUE  +  0.212  0.681  0.496  
CEODUAL  -  -0.199  -0.615  0.539  
BOARDSIZE  ?  -0.016  -0.207  0.836  
BOARDINDEP  ?  -0.845  -0.692  0.489  
BOARDMEET  ?  0.521  1.166  0.244  
BLOCK  ?  -0.821  -0.633  0.527  
PINST  -  -1.348  -3.157  0.002***  
NAS  +  0.158  1.691  0.091*  
BUSY  +  1.654  4.082  0.000*** 
Industries    Included      
Years    Included      
Observations    2,264      
Adjusted R2        0.077  
F-value    6.698***      
          
          
          
          
*, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
The p-values are one-tailed for variables with an expected sign and two-tailed otherwise. 







 This study presents evidence that utilizes a newly created index to measure the 
board-level ERM oversight engagement (BODERMX) disclosed in annual proxy 
statements provided to the SEC.  The creation of the BODERMX variable allows for a 
better understanding of the ERM oversight practices typically disclosed by boards of 
directors.  The BODERMX variable is calculated as a sum of practices disclosed by each 
company and is utilized to explore different hypotheses.  The use of the index will be 
extended beyond this paper by providing researchers with a tool to gauge the varying 
extent of efforts put forth by boards related to ERM oversight.  The index can also help 
analysts, investors, companies, their boards of directors, auditors, and risk management 
professionals understand the usage and relative importance of different ERM practices, 
including their relationship to the volatility of earnings, firm valuation, and pricing 
decisions by external auditors.  Policy makers should also be interested in utilizing the 
index to determine the overall effects of ERM as a practice and to further understand 
which components are most important to the diverse set of ERM information users. 
 The study next considers the context of different users of this information.  
Managers, directors, investors, analysts, and auditors may all have different views and 
value when observing the board-level ERM engagement practiced by an organization.  
The findings of the study related to volatility of earnings are consistent with firms 





disclosed.  The results are robust and stronger when only companies appearing in the 
S&P 500 index for all five years of the sample (2010-2014) are utilized.  Additionally, 
companies in the S&P 500 for all five years demonstrate a lower mean variance of 
earnings than those that do not.  These companies may be benefitting from a more stable 
environment, and be able to better implement ERM systems due to their maturity and 
size.  These results provide support to earlier literature in the area of ERM regarding 
firms with higher levels of ERM attaining a higher level of performance through lower 
volatility of earnings (Edmonds, Edmonds, Leece, and Vermeer, 2015).  The ability to 
navigate and, where appropriate, take risk, is of paramount concern both to managers and 
directors.  Utilizing ERM to allow for stable or smooth earnings is of benefit to the 
organization and its stakeholders.  Different stakeholders may benefit from different 
levels of VE.  While a director or regulator may seek a lower variance of earnings, an 
investor trying to earn a short-term gain may benefit from a high degree of volatility.  
Additionally, an auditor may view a low variance of earnings in turbulent times as a 
possible sign of material misstatement of financial results or a sign of possible earnings 
management. 
 The BODERMX is next used to understand the lens used by investors and 
analysts.  The main model results of the analysis of the relationship between market 
valuation and the BODERMX index is supported by the original sample of all companies 
in the S&P 500 index for the five-year period 2010-2014.  However, the results utilizing 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) and BODERMX are opposite those found in earlier work (McShane, 
Nair, and Rustambekov, 2011; Baxter, Bedard, Hoitash, and Yezegel, 2013).  This 





stable firms, as the investors manage their own risk through investment portfolio 
diversity.  These results are strengthened when companies only in the S&P 500 all five 
years are included, again pointing to companies that are stable and perform consistently.  
Additional analysis suggests that the strategic implications of ERM are important to 
investors, as supported by a resource dependence view, but ERM governance efforts may 
not be as important to them, supported by agency theory.  The TQ model invites further 
discussion about the meaning of “value” of ERM information to different ERM 
information stakeholders.  The use of the BODERMX index in a different context with 
more companies that are less stable would be beneficial as a future research topic. 
The results of the third hypothesis do not indicate a relationship between 
AUDFEE and BODERMX when considered in a robust audit fee model. This lack of 
significant results may indicate that auditors do not value additional ERM engagement in 
their risk assessment and fee-setting processes, consistent with the findings of Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2014). The findings of sensitivity analysis utilizing 
BODERMX and alternate variables are addressed in the following paragraphs. 
The study of the complexity of the board-level ERM oversight disclosure through 
the use of word and sentence counts reveals a significant negative association between 
these variables and VE.  These results are generally consistent with and supportive of the 
main analysis.  This finding supports the relationship of a more complex ERM oversight 
disclosure to a lower degree of earnings volatility.  TQ and word count also have a 
significant relationship, indicating that words as a measure of complexity support the 
analysis of firm value.  Additionally, the alternate measure of text complexity supports 





TQ.  These important measures indicate that certain stakeholders may benefit from 
utilizing text complexity in the analysis of board-level ERM oversight disclosure, 
whereas others may not. 
The next alternate measure involves analyzing the individual components that 
make up the BODERMX variable both in a single regression model (grouped) and in 
stand-alone regressions (one at the time).  VE displays an inverse relationship with the 
presence of a management-level risk committee and the reporting frequency to the board 
using both methods.  These two areas indicate the contribution these practices make 
towards the stability of earnings, supported by resource dependence theory.  The presence 
and frequency of the latter of these two variables have an important place in the volatility 
of earnings.  It may be helpful if these measures are considered by risk professionals, 
directors, managers, analysts, investors, auditors and regulators as important signals 
concerning the amount of management interaction with the board concerning risk. 
Firm valuation is next measured by grouping the BODERMX variables in one 
regression.  The integration of strategy and ERM has a strong positive relationship, 
indicating the importance of this practice to a firm’s valuation.  The strategic ERM 
emphasis is likely an indicator of a company realizing potential upside strategies to not 
only counter downside risk but to have positive growth effects for the company.  The 
presence of a management-level risk committee, utilization of the phrase “ERM,” the 
participation of the board in setting the firm’s risk appetite, and the reporting frequency 
all have a negative association with firm valuation as measured by TQ.  These practices 
taken as a whole suggest that investors appreciate strategic ERM, but do not place value 





Audit fees have a strong positive relationship with the integration of strategy with 
ERM, both in the grouped and stand-alone regressions.  This would be counter to the 
findings of Cohen et al. (2014), where auditors did not regard the integration of ERM and 
strategy.  These findings are important to better understand the importance of ERM 
efforts to auditors.  The positive relationship indicates that external auditors currently 
charge higher fees with the integration of strategy and ERM, indicating a higher 
assessment of risk.  This positive relationship may be due to auditors viewing their clients 
as taking more risk when the employ ERM strategically.  The presence of board oversight 
of ERM and participation of the board in the risk-appetite setting process have a negative 
association with audit fees, possibly indicating that auditors value these practices as a 
sign of increased risk management.  These various directional results seem to indicate 
that auditors value different aspects of ERM differently. 
The analysis next turns to separating the eight BODERMX variables and running 
them in separate regressions.  Volatility of earnings has a negative relationship with the 
presence of a management-level risk committee and the frequency of ERM updates, 
underscoring the importance of those two practices by firms in order to promote lower 
volatility of earnings as discussed above.  Firm valuation has a strong positive association 
with the integration of strategy and ERM, underscoring its importance to the future 
valuation potential of a firm to analysts and investors.   
The presence of a 1) management-level risk committee, 2) the phrase “enterprise 
risk management” being utilized in the disclosure, 3) reporting frequency to the full board 
or a committee on ERM matters, 4) participation of the board in the risk-appetite setting 





association with firm valuation, which may indicate that analysts and investors view this 
as either an indicator of additional risk being taken or experienced by the firm or 
additional monitoring costs that are not needed.  An examination of the factors, when 
grouped in a single regression, indicates that both external value and audit ERM 
information views may need to key in on the integration of strategy and ERM, which is 
generally seen as associated with ERM maturity within an organization.  
The relationship between audit fees and the integration with strategy and ERM is 
again strong and positive.  This underscores its importance to auditors in the fee setting 
process.  Firms integrating these two topics may be seen as taking additional risk by the 
auditor, resulting in higher fees.  Audit fees and board oversight of ERM processes, the 
presence of a management-level risk committee, and the participation of the board in the 
risk-appetite setting process all have negative relationships with audit fees.  This 
indicates that auditors are likely incorporating these practices in their fee models with 
resulting lower risk assessments, and therefore, audit fees. 
The results of the analysis where only non-banking or insurance companies were 
included have significant results when VE is regressed by BODERMX.  The same held 
for the results of the banking and insurance sample.  These results are consistent with the 
findings by Beasley, Pagach, and Warr (2008).  Future research could be conducted to 
better understand the impact of high levels of regulation and the “boiler-plating” effect 
that regulation within these industries creates with regard to both practices and 
disclosures. 
The relationship between TQ and BODERMX for companies other than banking 





banking and insurance were not significant.  This finding indicates that analysts and 
investors may not find further value in increased ERM efforts by the board of directors 
for companies not in the banking and insurance industries.  The lack of significance for 
the banking and insurance companies only may be due to sample size. 
The association between audit fees and BODERMX was not significant for 
companies other than banking and insurance, but has a strong negative relationship with 
companies only in banking and insurance.  This pattern may indicate that auditors are 
able to use the more defined and regulated risk management activities in banking and 
insurance to better appreciate a higher level of ERM oversight in their risk assessment 
and fee-setting process for those industries. 
The final analysis includes understanding the relationship that audit lag shares 
with BODERMX.  The results indicate a strong positive relationship between audit lag 
and ERM effort by the board.  This finding could indicate that auditors sense a higher 
level of risk, and thus take longer to complete the audit when more ERM governance is 
present, or that boards and management that perform more ERM activities are slower to 
respond to questions and findings from auditors.  
 To conclude these findings, contributions of this research include the 
establishment of the board-level ERM engagement index (BODERMX).  This index has 
several uses for different disciplines.  Researchers will be able to utilize the index as a 
variable in their ERM research.  The strength of the individual variables that comprise 
BODERMX, both in a single regression model as well as stand-alone regressions, will 





 Boards of directors, management of organizations, and regulators can utilize the 
index and results from the individual variables to understand which ERM practices are 
most important.  Auditors could also use these variables to assess various client risks.  
Additionally, the contribution of the negative significant relationship found between VE 
and BODERMX provides further evidence that internal measurement of ERM does work, 
providing robust results.  The significantly negative the relationship between TQ and 
BODERMX in the main analysis suggests that users of ERM information, such as 
analysts and investors, may interpret the disclosure of more board-level ERM oversight 
effort as a sign of increased risk, or as additional, undesired monitoring cost.  The non-
significant association between audit fees and BODERMX may indicate that auditors do 
not utilize board-level ERM engagement as a whole.   
There are some potential limitations regarding this research that require further 
discussion.  First, the sample consists of some of the largest U.S. publicly traded 
companies.  Therefore, the results obtained may not be generalizable to smaller publicly 
held or private companies, governmental entities or non-profit organizations.  One 
explanation frequently given is that larger organizations have more resources available to 
devote to ERM implementation.  These larger organizations may also decide to adopt 
programs earlier than other organizations, allowing those programs to reach maturity 
more quickly.  Future research could focus on the effect of ERM disclosures and 
practices in smaller companies, governments, and non-profit organizations. 
 Second, the proxies utilized for investor and auditor use of ERM information may 
not properly reflect the intended construct.  This possible misspecification of constructs 





firms is hand-collected, there could be errors or omissions in the data collection process.  
One of the largest concerns of using reported data is coding a factor “absent” when the 
firm practices, but fails to disclose that factor.  Finally, since the extent of ERM 
disclosure is voluntary, the potential for selection bias is a limitation.  
 In conclusion, this study created a board-level ERM engagement index 
(BODERMX) for use both within and beyond this study.  The hypothesis testing and 
alternate analysis performed have revealed differing “views” of ERM information 
utilized by different stakeholders.  The results and conclusion of this paper need to be the 
subject of future research in order to better understand how these different users of ERM 
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APPENDIX - Description of Procedures Utilized to Code ERM Oversight Disclosures, 
Description, and Frequency of Occurrence of Board-Level ERM Oversight Disclosures 
 
Overview of Process to Collect and Code Disclosures 
1. The Compustat North America Annual database was queried for companies 
comprising the S&P 500 index for each year (2010-2014).  The resulting 
company name and identifying information such as CIK was exported to an excel 
file. 
2. The directEDGAR software application was utilized to extract the proxies for the 
companies by year and CIK code.  The search within the ISYS Query tool (a 
component of directEDGAR) was set to search for the word “risk.”  The 
disclosure section is typically labeled with terms such as “Role in Risk 
Oversight,” “Risk Oversight,” and “Role in Risk Management.”  The section was 
then copied from the proxy into the corresponding company record within the 
excel spreadsheet.  If no board risk oversight disclosure was found, the audit 
committee disclosure was reviewed.  The lack of any board-level risk oversight 
disclosure was observed a few times in 2014 but was more frequent in 2010. 
3. The disclosures for board risk oversight were read for practices and each distinct 
practice added as a category as it was encountered.  The first year coded was 






reached around 200 different company disclosures, as few additional practices 
were discovered after that. 
Description of Oversight Disclosure Practices Identified  
The initial research question concerning the capture of board-level ERM oversight 
practices disclosed in proxies came from reading points of disclosure utilized in prior 
research (Edmonds, Edmonds, Leece & Vermeer, 2015) and thought papers (Deloitte 
Development, LLC, 2013). The disclosures were read to identify all practices 
disclosed and record their utilization by firm-year observation.  The total of observed 
practices is eight.  The following list explains each variable and contains its variable 
name.  The frequency of occurrence of these variables is contained in Table A1. 
1. The integration of strategy and ERM.  (INT_W_STRAT) COSO discusses the 
linkage between strategy and ERM as being a vital component that can lead to a 
successful ERM program.  Review of the disclosures revealed a number of 
companies that mentioned the word strategy or the strategic objective, but many 
did not elaborate as to how strategy and ERM were linked.  The variable was 
recorded as a one when a company mentioned strategy being utilized within their 
ERM environment.  Some companies utilized the word strategy but did not 
indicate its usage or linkage.  Those companies not indicating the specific usage 
or linking strategy with ERM were coded with a zero.  The percentage of 
companies disclosing an integration between strategy and ERM is 40.50%.  The 
percentage of companies reporting mostly or extensively that “existing risk 
exposures are considered when evaluating new strategic initiatives” was 48.00% 






2. Board oversight for risk responsibility.  (BOARD_OVERSIGHT) The disclosures 
were reviewed for explicit mention of board oversight for risk responsibility.  The 
percentage of companies disclosing this practice was 98.06%, which aligns with 
the 91% reported for the 2013 S&P 200 companies by Deloitte Development, 
LLC (2013). 
3. Management-level risk committee.  (MGT_RC) The disclosure of a management-
level risk committee was disclosed in 16.03% of the companies, which is 
comparative with 24% of companies disclosing a management-level risk 
committee in the 2013 S&P 200 index as reported by Deloitte Development, LLC 
(2013). 
4. Reporting frequency (REPT_FREQ) Reporting frequency is a continuous variable 
representing the number of times that the board of directors or a committee 
delegated responsibility for ERM receives a risk update from management.  
Control risk updates to an audit committee were not considered an ERM update 
for this process.  A total of 35.73% of the companies disclosed receiving at least 
one risk update at least annually in the sample. 
5. Chief risk officer.  (CRO) The presence of a Chief Risk Officer or equivalent 
designation such as Senior VP of Risk Management was disclosed in 13.56% of 
the companies.  This percentage compares to the 21% represented by the S&P 200 
as reported by Deloitte Development, LLC (2013) and the 32% reported in the 
survey by Beasley et al. (2015). 
6. The participation of the board in the risk-appetite setting process.  (RISK_APP) 






of the companies, compared with 13% of the S&P 200 in 2013 as reported by 
Deloitte Development, LLC (2013). 
7. Board committee assigned primary committee-level responsibility for ERM 
efforts.  (COMM_PRIMARY) The assignment of a board committee to oversee 
the overall committee-level ERM oversight activities of the board of directors. 
The assignment of a committee as the primary committee was disclosed by 
48.76% of the companies in the sample. 
8. Phrase “Enterprise Risk Management” utilized. (PHRASE_ERM_USED) The use 
of the phrase “enterprise risk management,” “ERM,” or any number of variations 
that the board may use to indicate that the entity practices ERM.  The ERM phase 









Table A1 - Frequency of Occurrence of Board-Level ERM Oversight Disclosures 
 
 2010 (N=436) 2011 (N=462) 2012 (N=449) 2013 (N=456) 2014 (N=461) Total (N=2,264) 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
(1) INT_W_STRAT 158 36.24% 181 39.18% 189 42.09% 197 43.20% 192 41.65% 917 40.50% 
(2) BOARD_OVERSIGHT 425 97.48% 455 98.48% 441 98.22% 449 98.46% 450 97.61% 2,220 98.06% 
(3) MGT_RC 81 18.58% 95 20.56% 91 20.27% 94 20.61% 92 19.96% 363 16.03% 
(4) REPT_FREQ30 151 34.63% 141 31.17% 168 38.53% 178 39.04% 171 39.22% 809 35.73% 
(5) CRO 53 12.16% 64 13.85% 64 14.25% 61 13.38% 65 14.10% 307 13.56% 
(6) RISK_APP 45 10.32% 49 10.61% 46 10.24% 47 10.31% 41 8.89% 228 10.07% 
(7) COMM_PRIMARY 200 45.87% 226 48.92% 219 48.78% 237 51.97% 222 50.33% 1,104 48.76% 
(8) PHRASE_ERM_USED 193 44.27% 220 47.62% 225 50.11% 228 50.00% 225 48.81% 1,091 48.19% 
 
                                                          
30 REPT_FREQ is a continuous variable with a range of zero to five to indicate the number of times the board or a committee of the board receives ERM updates 
annually.  This table only reports the REPT_FREQ variable if one or more updates are given per year. 
